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THE TAXATION OF CAUSE-RELATED MARKETING
TERRI LYNN HELGE*
INTRODUCTION
As the economic downturn prolongs, charities are faced with the dual
problems of decreased donations and increased demand for services. 1 In
order to combat the increasing shortfall in revenues, 2 many charities are
seeking creative ways to obtain funding. One potentially lucrative way to
increase funding for the charity is to leverage the charity's brand name and
goodwill by forming alliances with one or more for-profit corporations to
allow the charity's name or logo to be used in marketing the corporation's
products or services. This is known as cause-related marketing. 3
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. The author is very
grateful to Johnny Rex Buckles, David A. Brennen, Maxine Harrington, and David M. Rosenberg for
their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See generally LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., JOHN HOPKINS UNIV. CTR. FOR CIVIL SOC'Y
STUDIES, COMMUNIQUE No. 14, IMPACT OF THE 2007-09 ECONOMIC RECESSION ON NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS (2009) (describing the impact of the current economic recession on the charitable
sector).
2. See Derek N. Hassay & John Peloza, Building the Charity Brand Community, 21 J.
NONPROFIT & PUB. SECTOR MARKETING 24, 25 (2009) (noting that charities have recently seen de-
clines in direct donations and government support, and that there are an increasing number of charities
competing for funding each year).
3. See Dennis R. Young, Commercialism in Nonprofit Social Service Associations: Its Charac-
ter, Significance, and Rationale, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT 195, 198 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed.,
1998) (defining cause-related marketing as involving 'a relationship which ties a company, its custom-
ers and selected products to an issue or cause with the goal of improving sales and corporate image
while providing substantial income and benefits to the cause' (citation omitted)); Karen Maru File &
Russ Alan Prince, Cause Related Marketing and Corporate Philanthropy in the Privately Held Enter-
prise, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS, 1529, 1530 (1998) ("Although some definitions of cause related marketing
restrict the concept to those instances when a company promises to make a charitable contribution
contingent on customers' purchases, most define cause related marketing as corporate philanthropy
organized around the marketing objectives of increasing product sales or enhancing corporate identity."
(citations omitted)).
The birth of cause-related marketing occurred in 1983 when American Express announced a
campaign to raise funds to renovate the Statute of Liberty and Ellis Island. Dwane Hal Dean, Consumer
Perception of Corporate Donations: Effects of Company Reputation for Social Responsibility and Type
of Donation, J. ADVERTISING, Winter 2003-4, at 91, 92. For every use of its credit card, American
Express promised to donate a penny for the renovation of the Statute of Liberty-Ellis Island, and for
every new card issued in the United States, American Express promised to donate a dollar. Id. The
campaign was a success, and American Express donated $1.7 million to the renovation of the Statute of
Liberty-Ellis Island. Id. In contrast, American Express spent $6.7 million promoting the Statute of
Liberty renovation campaign. Id. Since 1983, corporate spending on cause-related marketing has devel-
883
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
By way of example, when the American Library Association needed
$25,000 to cover the cost of its upcoming conference in the early 1990s, it
was able to turn its $25,000 shortfall into a multi-million dollar promo-
tional event with Microsoft. 4 The American Library Association turned to
IEG-a company founded with the goal of establishing sponsorship as the
fourth arm of marketing-for assistance. Upon reviewing the potential
marketability of the American Library Association, Laren Ulkman, manag-
ing director of lEG Sponsorship Services, related "[a]nd we quickly said to
them, 'Don't worry about your $25,000. Do you realize that you have more
retail outlets than McDonald's and you have more cardholders than
VISA?' 5 lEG advised the American Library Association to start thinking
of itself as a brand and to realize the organization's overall potential market
value. "We put together some packages for them," Ulkman recalls, "which
quickly led to ALA signing a $10 million deal with Microsoft." 6
As the American Library Association example illustrates, charity
branding is a valuable commodity. 7 A study conducted by Cone, Inc. re-
ported that the most valuable charitable brand is the Y.M.C.A, having a
reported value of $6.4 billion.8 Rounding out the top five were The Salva-
tion Army at $4.7 billion,9 United Way of America at $4.5 billion, 10
American Red Cross at $3.1 billion,"I and Goodwill Industries Interna-
tional at $2.5 billion. 12 Many charities seek to capitalize on the value of
their "brands"'13 by engaging in cause-related marketing alliances. Such
alliances may include selling merchandise which prominently displays the
oped into a $1.3 billion-a-year industry. Colleen DeBaise, Cause and Effect: Linking a National Fran-
chiser to a Charity Can Both Unify an Organization and Help Businesses Stand Out in Their Local
Markets, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2007, at R9.
4. Mary Hutchings Reed, Nuts and Bolts of Sponsorship and Advertising Arrangements with
Non-Profits, in ALI-ABA Course of Study, Legal Issues in Museum Administration (Mar. 29-31,
2006), at 602.
5. Id. at 602.
6. Id. at 603.
7. See James T. Bennett & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Health Charities: Reputation for Sale?,
CONSUMERS' RES. MAG., July 1997, at 10, 14 ("[A] charity's 'brand name' is by far its most valuable
asset; indeed, without it no charity could long survive.").
8. CONE, THE CONE NONPROFIT POWER BRAND 100, at 13 (2009), available at






13. "Brand" generally refers to the name recognition that distinguishes an organization from its
competitors. See Adrian Sargeant, John B. Ford, & Jane Hudson, Charity Brand Personality: The
Relationship with Giving Behavior, 37 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 468, 469-70 (2008)
("'[A] brand is quite simply-who you are, what you say and what you do."' (citation omitted)).
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charity's name, logo, or trademark message in conjunction with a corporate
partner (branded merchandise) 14 or allowing the charity's name or logo to
be displayed on promotional products of the corporate partner (promotional
merchandise), 15 with a portion of the sales proceeds of those promotional
products donated to the charity.16 Cause-related marketing activities gener-
ate significant revenues for charities-more than $1 billion in 200517-and
both the number of charities engaging in cause-related marketing alliances
and the number of corporate partners involved in these alliances continue to
grow.
18
It is important to distinguish cause-related marketing from corporate
sponsorship. "Corporate sponsorship," refers to a relationship between a
charity and a for-profit corporation in which the for-profit corporation pri-
marily receives recognition for its support of the charity's mission or par-
ticular event. Corporations have historically invested marketing dollars in
furthering community causes, with the residual effect of building the corpo-
ration's goodwill. 19 But when the for-profit corporation also receives, in
return for its support of the charity, the right to use the name or logo of the
charity to directly affect the sale of the corporation's product, the corporate
sponsorship has morphed into cause-related marketing. Cause-related mar-
keting is a more "direct effort to sell the [corporation's] products or ser-
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See, e.g., Joanna L. Krotz, Community Icon; Clarifying What YMCA. Stands For, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at F31 (noting that the Y.M.C.A. has licensed the use of its name to form a
"charity of choice" alliance with Sports Illustrated and to enter into cause-related marketing alliances
with J.C. Penney, Kimberly-Clark and PepsiCo, "which will reap benefits from having their corporate
identities associated with Y programs").
17. Anonymous, Cause Marketing: After Two Decades of Growth, the $1 Billion Spending Mark
Is in Sight, ADVERTISING AGE, July 28, 2003, at 2.
18. See, e.g., Alan R. Andreasen, Cross-Sector Marketing Alliances: Partnerships, Sponsorships,
and Cause-Related Marketing, in NONPROFITS & BUSINESS 155, 175 (Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene
Steuerle eds., 2009); Lauren Gard, We're the Good Guys, Buy From Us, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, at
72. One company decided to manufacture a separate brand to facilitate its cause-related marketing
alliances. Berry Plastics Corp., a leading manufacturer of trash bags and other plastic packaging, intro-
duced the "i ComnitTM" brand in 2008. Breast Cancer; Berry Plastics Introduces i CommitTM Brand of
"Pink" Trash Bags to Benefit Susan G. Komen for the Cure, WOMEN'S HEALTH WKLY., Mar. 6, 2008,
at 463. The i CommitTM brand is "a unique, stand-alone product line that will contribute a portion of
every sale to charity." Id. Berry Plastics introduced the line with pink trash bags benefiting Susan G.
Komen for the Cure. Id.
19. In addition, for income tax purposes, the corporation may consider the donation to the charity,
which results in potential increased goodwill for the corporation, to be a deductible business expense
rather than a charitable contribution, the deduction of which is limited to ten percent of the corpora-
tion's taxable income. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 170(b)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (as amended in
1995) (providing that expenditures for institutional or goodwill advertising, which keep the corpora-
tion's name before the public, generally are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses
under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code if the expenses are related to the patronage that the
corporation might reasonably expect in the future).
2010]
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vices by capitalizing on the public's desire to leverage their dollars: con-
sumers can buy a product and support a good cause at the same time." 20 By
engaging in cause-related marketing, "the corporation expects its sponsor-
ship dollars to yield a measurable return not just in terms of public image
and goodwill, but product sales as well."'2
1
Cause-related marketing alliances provide mutual benefits to the char-
ity and the corporate partner. Charities benefit by the amount of donations
received directly from the campaign and by increasing resources and
awareness of the charity and its mission. 22 The corporate partners benefit
because cause-related marketing activities are generally profit motivated,
with donations based upon consumer behavior in the form of purchasing
the sponsoring company's products or services. 23 These benefits flowing to
the corporate partner give cause for concern about the appropriate tax
treatment of cause-related marketing alliances for the charity.
In general, charities are exempt from federal income tax,24 and dona-
tions to charities may be deducted by donors in computing the donors' tax
liabilities. 25 A predominant rationale for the special tax treatment and sub-
sidies of the charitable sector hinges on the belief that charities provide
services that are considerably different from, and in some cases better than,
the services provided by their for-profit counterparts. 26 When the lines
between charitable activity and for-profit activity cross, the justification for
special tax treatment of the charitable sector weakens. Since the 1950s, a
20. Reed, supra note 4, at 615.
21. Id.
22. See Stacy Landreth Grau & Judith Anne Garretson Folse, Cause-Related Marketing (CRM):
The Influence of Donation Proximity and Message-Framing Cues on the Less-Involved Consumer, J.
ADVERTISING, Winter 2007, at 19, 20.
23. Id.
24. See I.R.C. § 501(a), 501(c)(3).
25. See I.R.C. § 170.
26. See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) (advocating a capital subsidy theory of tax
exemption); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980); but
see generally Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990) (altruism
theory); Boris 1. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976) (income measurement theory); Evelyn
Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585
(1998) (third sovereign theory); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption
for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998) (risk-
compensation theory); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991) (donative theory). For a summary of these major theories
justifying the federal income tax exemption for charitable organizations, see Johnny Rex Buckles, The
Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity Under Federal
Income Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243, 1284-96 (2002) and John D. Co-
lombo, The Marketing Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories
for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215 (1994).
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tax known as the unrelated business income tax has been imposed on a
charity's net income from a regularly carried on trade or business that is
unrelated to the charity's tax-exempt purposes.27 Often times, the justifica-
tion for imposing this tax on a charity's net income from unrelated business
activities is that such activities involve unfair competition with the char-
ity's for-profit counterparts.
28
Despite the widespread success of cause-related marketing, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service has issued little guidance on acceptable practices by
charitable organizations engaged in cause-related marketing, leading to
unpredictable and uncertain tax results. An analysis of the application of
the unrelated business income tax regime and the prohibition on private
benefit to cause-related marketing alliances reveals that modifications to
existing Internal Revenue Service guidance should be made based on so-
cial, economic, and tax theory. To provide clarity to charities engaged in
cause-related marketing alliances, I advocate the establishment of Internal
Revenue Service guidance which sets forth a dual safe harbor under which
charities could operate to claim that the revenue they receive from cause-
related marketing alliances is exempt from the unrelated business income
tax and that the cause-related marketing alliance does not result in imper-
missible private benefit.
Part I of this article provides a detailed discussion of cause-related
marketing activities. Part II discusses the nature of the unrelated business
tax in general and its potential application to cause-related marketing alli-
ances. First, the sale of branded merchandise directly by the charity is ad-
dressed using a general unrelated business income tax analysis. Second, the
income received by the charity in the form of a "royalty" from the sale of
branded merchandise or promotional merchandise by the corporate partner
27. See John D. Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial Activity
by Charities, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 667, 670 (2007); Nathan Wirtschafter, Note, Fourth Quarter Choke:
How the IRS Blew the Corporate Sponsorship Game, 27 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 1465, 1470 (1994).
28. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983) ("The primary objective of adoption of the
unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated
business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business
endeavors with which they compete."); see generally Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, Differ-
ential Taxation of Nonprofits and the Commercialization of Nonprofit Revenues, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 195, 211 (1998) (comparing commercial activities of the nonprofit sector to those of its for-
profit counterparts and concluding that "the differential taxation of nonprofits and for-profits creates
opportunities for nonprofits to earn above-normal returns on commercial ventures"); but see Michael
Rushton, Why are Nonprofits Exempt From the Corporate Income Tax?, 36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 662 (2007) (arguing that the justification for exemption from income tax on a charity's
business activities should be rooted in the charity's inability to distribute profits from these activities to
private individuals (unlike their for-profit counterparts) rather than concerns over unfair competition);
John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 487,
529-46 (2002) (questioning unfair competition as a justification for the unrelated business income tax).
20101
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is analyzed under the corporate sponsorship rules and the royalty exception.
In addition, consideration is given to whether, in light of consumer percep-
tion of product endorsement by the charity, the income could be treated as
advertising income subject to inclusion in the charity's unrelated business
taxable income (UBTI) under existing law. This analysis reveals that exist-
ing guidance is conflicting, which leads to unpredictable and uncertain
results. Therefore, I conclude this section with a call for Internal Revenue
Service guidance on the unrelated business income tax treatment of reve-
nues from cause-related marketing alliances which specifically takes into
account the unique nature of cause-related marketing activities.
As discussed more fully in Part III, the nature and extent of the bene-
fits for the corporate partner from the cause-related marketing alliance is
troubling from a tax-exemption perspective. Cause-related marketing alli-
ances allow a charity's most valuable assets, its brand and goodwill, to be
used to benefit private entities. While the charity indeed benefits in return,
the central concern needs to be whether the corporate partner is improperly
benefiting from the use of the charity's brand or goodwill. If the corporate
partner receives improper benefits, then the charity may violate the prohibi-
tion on private benefit, possibly jeopardizing the charity's tax-exempt
status. With very little existing guidance on private benefit implications of
cause-related marketing, charities need safe harbor guidance identifying
cause-related marketing alliances that do not place a charity's tax-
exemption at risk. Part III discusses the prohibition on private benefit, the
application of the private benefit doctrine to cause-related marketing alli-
ances, and the implications private benefit concerns should have in forming
the appropriate safe harbor determination of cause-related marketing alli-
ances. Part IV concludes with a suggested framework within which the safe
harbor guidance I advocate should be considered, taking into account tax,
economic, and private benefit concerns.
I. NATURE OF CAUSE-RELATED MARKETING ACTIVITIES
Cause-related marketing activities are as diverse as the nonprofit sec-
tor. The alliances between charities and corporate partners can vary in a
number of dimensions, including the number of corporate partners involved
in the campaign, the length of the commitment and the level of investment
by the corporate partner, the level of collaboration as brand-level or com-
pany-level, and the amount of donations to the charity as fixed or vari-
able.2 9 For purposes of this article, I have assumed that the cause-related
29. Andreasen, supra note 18, at 159-60.
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marketing alliance does not create a joint venture or a partnership, 30 al-
though some may be structured in this manner. Additionally, the type of
products or services involved in the cause-related marketing alliance may
involve what I refer to as "branded merchandise ' 31 or "promotional mer-
chandise."' 32 Finally, the benefits realized by the charity and the corporate
partner may vary greatly from one alliance to the next and are divided into
first-order benefits and second-order benefits. 33 First-order benefits refer to
the direct financial remuneration received by the charity and the corporate
30. Even if a transaction is not formally structured as a partnership or joint venture, the Internal
Revenue Service or a court may, in appropriate circumstances, recharacterize the arrangements as a
partnership or joint venture. A partnership is "an association of two or more persons to carry on a
business as co-owners for profit", regardless of whether the persons intend to create a partnership or
whether the association is called a "partnership," "joint venture," or other name. Rev. Unif. Partn. Act.
§ 101(6) (1997). Circumstances that are indicative of a partnership or joint venture include (1) sharing
profits, (2) sharing losses, and (3) a mutual right of control or management of the enterprise. See id at
§ 202(c). A charity that enters into a joint venture or partnership can implicate, among other things,
concerns of whether the charity is improperly benefitting private interests and whether the charity will
receive unrelated business income; however, the most significant concern is whether the arrangements
will adversely affect the charity's tax-exempt status. Historically, the Internal Revenue Service viewed
joint ventures and partnerships with for-profit entities as impermissible vehicles for providing taxable
entities with the opportunity to share in the net proceeds of an income-producing venture undertaken by
the exempt organization. See generally Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should
Change Its Stance on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21 (2005). Exempt
organizations participating in such arrangements were viewed as (i) failing to operate exclusively for
charitable purposes, (ii) permitting inurement of the organization's net earnings to private shareholders
or individuals, or (iii) allowing significant private benefits. Since 1982, the Internal Revenue Service
has been more accepting of such arrangements, as long as certain factors are present. A charity may
generally form and participate in a partnership and continue to operate exclusively for charitable pur-
poses if (i) "participation in the partnership furthers a charitable purpose," and (ii) "the partnership
arrangement permits the exempt organization to act exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purpose
and only incidentally for the benefit of the for-profit partners." Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 975.
The determination of whether a nonprofit organization's participation in a partnership furthers a chari-
table purpose "'is not limited to whether the partnership provides some (or even an extensive amount
of) charitable services."' Id. at 976 (quoting St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d
232, 243 (5th Cir. 2003)). The nonprofit partner also must have the capacity to ensure that the partner-
ship's operations further charitable purposes. Id. In each situation, the particular facts must be carefully
evaluated. Private inurement and private benefit concerns can arise in a variety of ways in the context of
a partnership or joint venture. For example, procedures for allocating profits and losses that fail to
reflect the partners' contribution to the partnership may result in private inurement or private benefit.
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (May 27, 1988). The specific facts must be carefully evaluated in
every situation. If (i) the activities of a partnership attributed to an exempt organization constitute a
substantial part of the exempt organization's activities, and (ii) the partnership regularly conducts a
trade or business that is not substantially related to the exempt organization's exempt purposes, the
exempt organization's tax exempt status is threatened. In contrast, if the activities of the partnership do
not constitute a substantial part of the exempt organization's activities (and the organization does not
otherwise engage in significant unrelated business activities), the organization's exempt status is not
threatened, but the organization may have UBTI. In determining whether the organization has UBTI,
the partnership's activities are evaluated as if those activities were performed directly by the exempt
organization. See Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 975-76.
31. See infra Part I.A.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See Andreasen, supra note 18, at 158.
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partner from the cause-related marketing campaign. 34 Second-order bene-
fits are benefits expected to improve the charity's or the corporate partner's
performance in the future.
35
A. Branded Merchandising
Branded merchandising involves the sale of a utilitarian item, such as
a t-shirt, hat, pin, or bracelet, which bears the logo or trademark message of
the charity. Branded merchandise is intended to promote the charity's cause
or message by enabling supporters of the cause to wear items showing their
support and encouraging others to talk about the message.36 The charity
will typically contract with one or more companies to manufacture the
branded merchandise, and such companies may include their own logos on
the branded merchandise as well. In some cases, the charity sells the
branded merchandise on its own website to supporters of the charity's
cause. In other cases, the corporate partner sells the branded merchandise
through its own physical stores and web store. In still other cases, the
branded merchandise may be offered through both the charity's website
and the corporate partner's web store and physical stores. Normally, some
portion of the proceeds or profits from the sale of the branded merchandise
will benefit the charity.
One of the most celebrated branded merchandising alliances is that of
the Lance Armstrong Foundation and Nike. Lance Armstrong, famed can-
cer survivor and seven-time Tour de France champion, 37 formed the Lance
Armstrong Foundation in 1997 to inspire and empower people affected by
cancer.38 In 2004, the Lance Armstrong Foundation partnered with Nike to
produce a yellow rubber bracelet bearing Lance Armstrong's trademark
slogan for cancer survivors, LIVESTRONG. 39 Each bracelet was sold for
one dollar, and all the proceeds from the sale of the bracelets were donated
to the Lance Armstrong Foundation. Nike originally planned to produce
only five million bracelets. 40 However, the bracelets became an instant
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Jill Lieber, Brace Yourself Wearing Support on Your Wrist, USA TODAY, July 7, 2005, at
IC ("'One of the reasons why [cause] bracelets are so successful is that people not only want to support
good causes, but they also want to proclaim that they're doing that."').
37. See Alan Snel, Lance's Legacy Likely to Keep Selling, TAMPA TRIB., July 26, 2005, Money-
sense, at 1.
38. Allen Salkin, It's Not About the Bike, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, Sports Tuesday, at 1.
39. See Sal Ruibal, Armstrong Wristbands Yield $63M to Fight Cancer, USA TODAY, July 17,
2007, at 8C ("'Livestrong has become something bigger, a way of life, a challenge, a goal, a way to set
the bar higher."').
40. See Carolyn Shapiro, Popular Lance Armstrong Wristbands Spawn Counterfeits, BOSTON
[Vol 85:3
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success, and cause-minded fans clamored to have their own
LIVESTRONG bracelet. 41 At one point, the LIVESTRONG bracelets were
touted by the media as the "must-have" fashion accessory of the moment.42
The success of the bracelets transformed into an entire line of
LIVESTRONG merchandise, including cycling, running, and walking ap-
parel; sports bags; and blankets, all bearing the color yellow and the
LIVESTRONG slogan along with the trademark Nike "swoosh" symbol.43
The LIVESTRONG collection is offered for purchase on the Lance Arm-
strong Foundation website44 and both on Nike's web store and in their
physical stores. Nike donates 100 percent of the profits from its sale of the
LIVESTRONG collection to the Lance Armstrong Foundation.45 Nike's
alliance with the Lance Armstrong Foundation has raised over $80 million
to date. 46
The success of the LIVESTRONG campaign quickly spread to other
color-coded cause-related marketing alliances for charity causes.47 One
such prominent campaign is the American Heart Association's "Go Red for
Women" campaign, which uses a trademark red dress symbol to promote
education on the risks of heart disease for women.
For the "Go Red" campaign, American Heart Association partners with
companies to co-brand products that offer a portion of their proceeds to
benefit its effort to educate women about heart disease. Calendar marker
GLOBE, Jan. 28, 2005. The original five million bracelets were sold exclusively in Nike stores. Yellow
Fever in the U.S. Gives Nike a Boost, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 2004, RedEye, at 13. Over 70 million
LIVESTRONG bracelets have been sold to raise money for the Lance Armstrong Foundation. Salkin,
supra note 38. Sales of the LIVESTRONG bracelets have produced more than $63 million in support
for the Lance Armstrong Foundation. Ruibal, supra note 39.
41. See, e.g., Alicia C. Shepard, Wrist and Recuperation; Yellow Bracelet Makes Fashion-and
Health-Statement, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2004, at C09; Jeff Daniel, $1 "LIVESTRONG" Bracelet
Forget Tiffany's Is the Elite of Jewelry, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2004, at E01; see also
Shapiro, supra note 40 (noting that the wild success of the bracelets spawned the production of similar
bracelets in blue, green, pink, purple, red and yellow, bearing the label "Strength Courage Victory").
42. See, e.g., John Kessler, Wristbands Morph from Charity to Fad, ATLANTA J. CONST., May 13,
2005, at Al; Grace Aduroja, Fundraising with a Sense of Fashion; Wristbands Promoting Causes a
Must-Have, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2005, Metro, at I ("[T]he $1 bracelets have graced the wrists of every-
one from actress Angelina Jolie to President Bush and evolved from a fashionable fundraising item to
an adolescent essential.").
43. See Press Release, Nike, Inc., Nike and Lance Armstrong Foundation Launch
LIVESTRONGTM Collection with All Profits Going to Lance Armstrong Foundation (July 17, 2007).
44. See LIVESTRONG Store, http://store-laf.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
45. Nike and Lance Armstrong Foundation Launch LIVESTRONGT Collection, supra note 43.
46. Nike LIVESTRONG Collection, http://www.nike.coninikeos/p/livestrongen_.US/products
(last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (The front of Nike's LIVESTRONG store simply states "[w]ear yellow and
help turn hope into action.").
47. See Nancy Coltun Webster, LIVESTRONG: Color Coded Causes, ADVERTISING AGE, June 13,
2005, at 31.
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[sic] Day-Timer offers a red planner that includes heart healthy recipes,
activity and eating plan pages. Hanes offered a limited edition T-shirt
that gave 70% of the proceeds and sold it through Macy's, a national
American Heart partner .... Swarovski's crystal version of the organiza-
tion's red dress lapel pin spawned a line of jewelry called The Power of
Love.
48
Another prominent branded merchandising campaign is the
(PRODUCT)Red campaign which supports The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria (The Global Fund). Formed by U2 lead singer,
Bono, The Global Fund's mission is to raise awareness and funds for
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria relief worldwide. 49 Many high profile
companies, such as Starbucks, Gap, and Microsoft, have partnered in a
marketing alliance to offer red-colored products which bear the trademark
(PRODUCT)Red symbol. 50 A portion of the proceeds from the sale of these
products benefit The Global Fund; the amount varies from company to
company. 5 1 As of December 2009, these cause-related marketing alliances
have generated $140 million for The Global Fund.
52
These examples illustrate the popularity and prevalence of cause-
related marketing alliances that involve branded merchandise. Common
among these alliances is the use of a trademark color and symbol that evi-
dence support for the charity's mission on the company's product. The
main motivation for a consumer to purchase the product is to visibly dis-
play the consumer's support for the cause to others by wearing or display-
ing the product. This distinguishes branded merchandise from promotional
merchandise.
B. Promotional Merchandising
Promotional merchandising involves a commitment by the corporate
partner to donate a specific amount of money or a percentage of the pro-
ceeds or profits from the sale of the specified product or service to the char-
ity, 53 often with a financial cap. 54 Although not always the case, for
48. Id.
49. See The Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
50. See The Global Fund, Product Red, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/privatesector/red/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2010).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. One study notes that if the marketer of the product decides to give more per purchase in a
given marketing campaign, such increase in cost is likely to be passed on to consumers in one form or
another. Michal Strahilevitz, The Effects of Product Type and Donation Magnitude on Willingness to
Pay More for a Charity-Linked Brand, 8 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 215, 217 (1999).
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purposes of this article, I refer to "promotional merchandising" as including
only those sales transactions in which the charity agrees to allow the corpo-
rate partner to place the charity's name or logo on the promotional product.
The charity typically receives a fee from the corporate partner for the use of
the charity's name or logo, which may be a fixed amount, or more typi-
cally, a specified percentage of the proceeds from the sale of the promo-
tional product.55 Normally, the charity retains the right to approve the way
in which its name or logo is used on the promotional product.
One example of promotional merchandising is General Mill's ongoing
Yoplait yogurt campaign with the slogan "Save Lids to Save Lives."'56 Each
year, General Mills produces specially marked Yoplait yogurt containers
with pink lids that prominently display the trademark pink ribbon symbol
for breast cancer awareness. For each pink lid from a Yoplait yogurt con-
tainer returned by customers to General Mills, General Mills promises to
donate ten cents to the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation, up to
$1.5 million per year. 57 To date, this cause-related marketing campaign has
raised over $25 million for the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Founda-
tion.58 The Yoplait campaign is just one of many cause-related marketing
alliances formed to support breast cancer awareness and research.
59
Another example of promotional merchandising is the Kohl's Cares
for Kids campaign, conducted throughout the year in local Kohl's stores
and on the Kohl's website. 60 As part of this campaign, Kohl's offers a spe-
cially marked line of children's books and stuffed animals for purchase at
five dollars each. All of the profits from the sales of this specially marked
merchandise are donated to support children's initiatives such as injury
prevention; immunizations; and education programs for diabetes, asthma,
and childhood obesity. To date, the program has raised over $126 million
for children's health and education initiatives nationwide.
Companies engage in promotional merchandising as a marketing
strategy to encourage sales of the promotional product. Purchasing promo-
tional merchandise makes consumers feel good about supporting the char-
ity's cause. Studies of consumer behavior reveal that consumers are more
54. See Andreasen, supra note 18, at 161.
55. Id. at 159-161.
56. See Yoplait, Save Lids to Save Lives, http://www.yoplait.co msls (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
57. Id. General Mills guarantees a minimum donation of $500,000 per year. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Mercedes M. Cardona, Marketers Think Pink for Breast Cancer Awareness,
ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 23, 2000, at 18.
60. See Kohl's Cares for Kids Merchandise,
http://www.kohlscorporation.com/communityrelations/community02.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
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likely to purchase a product that supports a charitable cause over a compet-
ing product which does not.61 In some cases, however, consumers may be
motivated to purchase the product because the consumers believe that the
charity is endorsing the promotional product by allowing the charity's
name or logo to be placed on the product packaging or advertising for the
product. 62 While a charity normally does not explicitly endorse the promo-
tional product as part of the cause-related marketing alliance, consumer
perception of apparent product endorsement is troubling and could have
significant implications on the appropriate tax treatment of the cause-
related marketing alliance for the charity, as further discussed below.
It is important to distinguish promotional merchandising from the use
of certification marks by a charity. A certification mark is a symbol used to
indicate that the product meets certain specified standards set by the mark's
owner.63 For example, the American Heart Association maintains a heart-
check certification mark, symbolizing that the product meets the American
Heart Association's criteria for "saturated fat and cholesterol for healthy
people over age 2.' ' 64 Usually in exchange for a fee, the mark's owner al-
lows others to use the mark on their products as a symbol that the product
meets certain standards, and thus the certification mark allows consumers
to rely on the mark's owner for information about the seller's goods or
services. Because consumers rely on the mark owner's approval of the
mark's use, the Lanham Act imposes certain requirements on the owner for
the mark to remain valid. In particular, the owner must be able to control
the use of the mark, may not allow the mark to be used for purposes other
than to certify, and must provide certification to all those who meet the
relevant criteria for certification and request the certification. Thus, while
companies may seek certification marks from charities which maintain
them, such as American Heart Association, to promote the sale of their
products, there is no representation that a portion of the sales of the prod-
ucts bearing the certification mark will benefit charity. Accordingly, the
use of certification marks is distinct from promotional advertising encom-
61. See infra Part l|I.A.
62. See infra Part 1lB.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
64. American Heart Association, Heart-Healthy Grocery Shopping Made Simple,
http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=2115 (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). Two com-
mentators criticize the American Heart Association's heart-check program as indicating little more than
the product meeting minimum government standards and chastise its policy of excluding companies
having a corporate relationship with a tobacco company from the certification program: "Whatever one
may think about smoking products, the fact that Post's Raisin Bran cannot carry the heart-check sym-
bol, but Kellogg's Raisin Bran and even Kellogg's Fruit Loops can, suggests the inherent hollowness of
the program's information." Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 7, at 11.
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passed by cause-related marketing. 65
C. Benefits of Cause-Related Marketing
Cause-related marketing has been described as a "win-win" situa-
tion. 66 The benefits for both the charity and the corporate partner can be
substantial. Commentators have divided the potential benefits from cause-
related marketing alliances into two subsets: first-order benefits and sec-
ond-order benefits. 67 As mentioned previously, first-order benefits involve
direct financial remuneration to the charity and the corporate partner while
second-order benefits involve gains which are expected to improve either
side's performance in the future.
For the charity, first-order benefits primarily include the donations
that the charity receives directly from the cause-related marketing cam-
paign. Second-order benefits for the charity may include favorable impact
on the charity's mission, enhanced visibility of the charity's cause or mes-
sage, and increased impact on new audiences. 68 The overall impact of first-
order and second-order benefits on the charity is difficult to quantify, in
part because research evidence on this issue is sparse.69 Cause-related mar-
keting activities generate significant revenues for charities-more than $1
billion in 2005-and both the number of charities engaging in cause-related
marketing alliances and the number of corporate partners involved in these
alliances continue to grow.70 However, the amount of pure donation reve-
nue that may be lost as the result of engaging in cause-related marketing
has not been quantified. Some research reports that individuals would not
decrease their donations to a particular charity if that charity were involved
in cause-related marketing, but other research has found that affinity card71
users may decrease direct donations to the charity that is supported by the
65. This article does not address the tax implications of the use of certification marks by charitable
organizations. It should be noted, however, that American Heart Association takes the position on its
Form 990 that the revenue it receives from its heart-check program is related program service revenue,
and thus exempt from taxation. See, e.g., American Heart Association Form 990, Return of Organiza-
tion Exempt From Income Tax, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2008, at p. 3, available at
www.guidestar.org.
66. See, e.g., Webster, supra note 47; John W. Pracejus, G. Douglas Olsen, & Norman R. Brown,
On the Prevalence and Impact of Vague Quantifiers in the Advertising of Cause-Related Marketing
(CRM), J. ADVERTIStNG, Winter 2003-4, at 19.
67. See Andreasen, supra note 18, at 158-181 (discussing the framework for first-order benefits
and second-order benefits and evaluating the impact of these benefits on the charity and the corporate
partner).
68. Id. at 159.
69. Id. at 175.
70. See id.
71. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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affinity card.72 Additionally, the potential negative second-order effects for
the charity are substantial, including monetary loss from a failed alliance,
consumer perception of excessive commercialism of the charity's goodwill,
consumer bitterness over misperception or obscurity in the amount donated
to the charity, and donor impression that the charity is "selling-out" by
aligning with a corporate partner which produces products or services
which are at odds with the charity's stated mission.73
For the corporate partner, the first-order benefit is largely the in-
creased sales of the promoted product or services and the corresponding
increased revenues from those sales. 74 Second-order benefits for the corpo-
ration may include increased corporate goodwill, increased brand loyalty,
improved company morale, and increased support from investors. 75 The
impact of cause-related marketing alliances on the financial performance of
the corporate partner may be difficult to discover and measuring the sec-
ond-order benefits to the corporate partner may be problematic. 76 However,
one study noted a positive relationship between cause-marketing alliances
and increased financial performance of the corporate partners in a majority
of the cases studied.77 Additionally, "[t]he rate of growth in cause-
marketing alliances certainly implies that corporations think there are major
second-order payoffs for cause-marketing alliances. '78
II. UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME
Charities normally must pay tax on their unrelated business taxable
income (UBTI). 79 UBTI consists of the gross income derived from any
unrelated trade or business 80 regularly carried on by the charity (with some
72. See Andreasen, supra note 18, at 176; cf Young, supra note 3, at 198 (explaining this phe-
nomenon as "crowding out"--when donors believe their contributions are not needed because of in-
creases in the charity's other source of revenues or because the character of those other revenues make
the charity seem less desirable).
73. See Andreasen, supra note 18, at 177-181; Cordes & Weisbrod, supra note 28, at 12; cf
Hassay & Peloza, supra note 2, at 38 ("[S]hoppers have also been known to boycott or disidentify with
certain brands because of their charity affiliations.").
74. See Hassay & Peloza, supra note 2, at 46 ("Research shows that 'doing good' is also good for
business, and marketers have realized sales increases as a result of [cause-related marketing] efforts.");
Nannette Byrnes, Smarter Corporate Giving: Targeted Donations, Support for Volunteers, and Con-
sumer Awareness Ads Are Paying Off, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 28, 2005, at 68. When asked about the success
of the Yoplait yogurt pink-lid campaign to benefit the Susan G. Komen Foundation, Chris Shea, presi-
dent of the General Mills Foundation, noted "sales were healthy." Id.
75. See Andreasen, supra note 18, at 160.
76. Id. at 169.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. I.R.C. § 511 (2006).
80. Treasury regulations imply that a charity's trade or business activities should be segregated
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deductions and modifications). 81 Generally, an activity is an "unrelated
trade or business" if it satisfies each element of the following three-part
test: (i) the activity constitutes a "trade or business," (ii) the activity is
"regularly carried on" by the organization, and (iii) the conduct of the ac-
tivity is "not substantially related to the performance of the organization's
exempt function. ' 82 Each of these requirements is briefly discussed in turn
below.8
3
into "specific business activities" to determine whether each set of "specific business activities" is
regularly carried on and whether a trade or business is "related" or "unrelated" to a charity's exempt
purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (b)-(c)(I) (as amended in 1983). In particular, in determining whether a
trade or business is "related" or "unrelated" to an organization's exempt purposes, the regulations
distinguish between particular subclasses of the same general activities:
Activities... from which a particular amount of gross income is derived do not lose identity
as trade or business merely because they are carried on within a larger aggregate of similar
activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related to
the exempt purposes of the organization. Thus, for example, the regular sale of pharmaceuti-
cal supplies to the general public by a hospital pharmacy does not lose identity as trade or
business merely because the pharmacy also furnishes supplies to the hospital and patients of
the hospital in accordance with its exempt purposes or in compliance with the terms of section
513(a)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). The foregoing example treats a hospital's sale of pharmaceutical supplies to
the general public and the hospital's sale of such supplies to patients as two distinct activities. Id. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also appears to distinguish between particular subclasses of the same
general activities when applying the unrelated business income tax. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86
F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996). In Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit analyzed "[t]he income Sierra Club re-
ceived from .. two business arrangements." Id. at 1527. First, the court considered whether the charity
was taxable on the income it generated by renting its mailing list to third parties for use in direct mail
solicitations. The court concluded that this income constituted "royalties," which are exempt from
unrelated business income tax. Id. at 1536. Second, the court considered whether the charity was tax-
able on the income it generated by providing its mailing list to a financial institution for use in market-
ing an "affinity" credit card featuring the charity's logo. The court stated that this income might
constitute royalties, or might not, depending on a factual issue (whether the charity provided services in
connection with the affinity card program). Id. at 1536-37. The court remanded the case to the Tax
Court to resolve that issue. Id. at 1537.
81. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2006).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a).
83. Engaging in an unrelated trade or business could also have significant implications on the tax-
exempt status of the charity. If the charity engages, to more than an insignificant extent, in activities
that lack a substantial relationship to the charity's exempt purpose, the charity may lose its exempt
status under Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1) (as amended in 2008). In determining whether an unrelated activity is more than
incidental to an organization's exempt activities, all the circumstances must be considered, including
the size and extent of the trade or business and the size and extent of the activities which are in further-
ance of the exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). Courts and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice generally consider (i) the amount of income derived from the activity in comparison to total
income, (ii) the amount of expenditures for the activity in comparison to total expenditures, and (iii) the
amount of time the organization's employees devote to the activity in comparison to total hours worked.
Although no bright line rule exists with respect to any of these inquiries, one case, by way of example,
determined that an organization formed to promote agriculture and horticulture did not qualify for
exemption when about 30 percent of the organization's gross income was derived from the operation of
a racetrack, an unrelated activity. Orange County Agric. Soc'y, Inc. v. Comm'r, 893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir.
1990). Another case denied a social club tax exempt status when 11 to 17 percent of its gross receipts
from its rental, restaurant, and bar service business came from nonmembers (and thus did not further its
exempt purposes). Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 615 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1980); see also
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A. In General
Taxation of a charity's income from commercial activities has been
traditionally justified on the basis of preventing potential unfair competi-
tion with for-profit providers of similar goods and services and protecting
the erosion of the corporate tax base. 84 The Supreme Court has adopted the
prevention of unfair competition as the underlying policy of the UBTI rules
stating that "[t]he undisputed purpose of the unrelated business income tax
was to prevent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly with
businesses whose earnings were taxed."' 85 Tax-exempt organizations pur-
portedly present two forms of unfair competition. First, because their prof-
its are not subject to tax, tax-exempt organizations could engage in
predatory pricing practices by charging less for similar goods and services
than their for-profit competitors, thereby driving competitors out of the
market. 86 Second, tax-exempt organizations could more easily accumulate
capital, allowing tax-exempt organizations a greater ability to expand,
which in turn gives them an unfair advantage over their competitors.
87
There are other policies supporting the enforcement of the UBTI rules be-
sides unfair competition; 88 however, unfair competition is the most often
touted.89
New Faith, Inc., 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050 (1992) (denying exempt status to alleged nonprofit public
benefit corporation when 80 percent of its gross expenditures and 100 percent of its gross revenues
came from operation of lunch trucks providing food to general public for scheduled "donations");
Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991) (denying exempt status to alleged religious
organization when its only current activities consisted of operating two restaurants and health food
stores in the same manner as commercial operations, aside from the presence of religious literature at
the establishments). In contrast, IRS General Counsel Memorandum 32,361 expressed doubt that a
charity's operation of a dining room, caf6, and bar in its community center were more than incidental to
the organization's exempt functions. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,361 (July 27, 1962). Although 60
percent of the organization's gross revenues were derived from such activities, (i) the dining rooms and
kitchen occupied a small percentage of the community center space, (ii) on average, thirty-four meals
were served per day, (iii) the dining room and bar were not open to the general public, (iv) operations
were too small, specialized, and sporadic to be financially self-sustaining, and (v) the volume of sales
was too small to cover the fixed costs thereof. Id.
84. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 28, at 529-34; Kevin M. Yamamoto, Taxing Income from
Mailing List andAffinity Card Arrangements: A Proposal, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 221, 252-53 (2001).
85. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1986).
86. Yamamoto, supra note 84, at 253.
87. Id. at 254.
88. Other policy considerations for limiting commercial activity of charities include: (1) diversion
of charitable managers' attention and resources from the core charitable mission; (2) creation of ineffi-
ciencies in the capital markets or the distribution of goods and services; (3) problematic determination
of a charity's true need for indirect government subsidy through tax exemption; and (4) exposure of
charitable assets to liability risk. Colombo, supra note 28, at 534-46.
89. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983) ("[T]he primary objective of adoption
of the unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the
unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt
business endeavors with which they compete."); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Nov. 22, 1991)
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1. Trade or Business Requirement
Since one of the main policy reasons for imposing UBTI on charities
is to maintain a level playing field between for-profit organizations and tax-
exempt charities, the meaning of trade or business for UBTI is consistent
with its definition for purposes of the income tax rules applicable to for-
profit organizations.90 The term "trade or business" generally includes any
activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or
performance of services. 91 In evaluating this criterion, courts and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service consider whether the organization has a profit mo-
tive92 and whether the organization's activity competes with that of for-
profit enterprises. 93 In determining whether a profit motive exists, signifi-
cant weight is given to objective factors such as whether the activity is
similar to profit-making activities conducted by commercial enterprises.
94
The mere fact that the activity is conducted as a fund-raising activity of the
charity is not sufficient to conclude that the activity is not a trade or busi-
("[T]he notion of unfair competition is the underlying reason for the enactment of the tax on unrelated
business income ..").
90. For purposes of section 513, "the term 'trade or business' has the same meaning it has in
section 162. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code governs the deductibil-
ity of trade or business expenses. In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that "to be
engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regu-
larity and.., the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit."
Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
91. I.R.C. § 513(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).
92. The most important element as to whether the activity is a trade or business is the presence of
a profit motive. In the context of a tax-exempt organization, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the
inquiry should be whether the activity "'was entered into with the dominant hope and intent of realizing
a profit."' United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 110 n.1 (1986) (quoting Brannen v.
Comm'r, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11 th Cir. 1984)). When the activity involved is highly profitable and
involves little risk, courts generally infer the presence of a profit motive. See, e.g., Carolinas Farm &
Power Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 699 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is no better
objective measure of an organization's motive for conducting an activity than the ends it achieves.");
La. Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 533 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that a profit
motive existed based on the fact that the organization was extensively involved in endorsing and admin-
istering an insurance program that proved highly profitable); Fraternal Order of Police v. Comm'r, 87
T.C. 747, 756 (1986) (reasoning that the organization's advertising activities were "obviously con-
ducted with a profit motive" because the activities were highly lucrative and with no risk or expense to
the organization), affd, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b); see, e.g., Louis W. & Maud Hill Family Found. v. United States, 347
F. Supp. 1225, 1228-29 (D. Minn. 1972). When applying this test, the Internal Revenue Service may
take into account a key purpose of the unrelated business income tax: to prevent unfair competition
between taxable and tax-exempt entities. "[W]here an activity does not possess the characteristics of a
trade or business within the meaning of section 162, such as when an organization sends out low cost
articles incidental to the solicitation of charitable contributions, the unrelated business income tax does
not apply since the organization is not in competition with taxable organizations." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-
1(b). But see La. Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 542 ("[T]he presence or absence of competition
between exempt and nonexempt organizations does not determine whether an unrelated trade or busi-
ness is to be taxed.").
94. 111. Ass'n of Prof'l Ins. Agents v. Comm'r, 801 F.2d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1986).
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ness.95
In determining the existence of a trade or business, the level of the
organization's activity is also an important factor. For example, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the receipt of payments by a tax-
exempt organization in connection with the organization's involvement
with insurance plans did not constitute a trade or business because the or-
ganization's activities were not extensive and were not of the type gener-
ally associated with a trade or business. 96 The organization's activities were
limited to the purchase of group policies offering coverage to its members;
the provision of membership lists to the insurance brokerage company that
handled all of the promotion, marketing, and administration of the pro-
gram; and the allowance of the use of the organization's endorsement by
the insurance company and the insurance brokerage company. 97 By con-
trast, organizations that actively sponsor and promote similar insurance
programs and that provide administrative services for the insurance com-
pany or the insurance brokerage company have been found to be engaged
in a trade or business. 98
2. Regularly Carried On Requirement
Even if a charity is engaged in an activity for profit, that activity will
not constitute a trade or business unless the charity is "involved in the ac-
tivity with continuity and regularity." 99 Section 512 sets forth this require-
ment in another way: to be an "unrelated trade or business," an activity
must be "regularly carried on." 100 In determining whether a business activ-
ity is "regularly carried on," the most important considerations are the fre-
95. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 115 (stating that a charity cannot escape taxation by
characterizing an activity as fundraising, because otherwise "any exempt organization could engage in a
tax-free business by 'giving away' its product in return for a 'contribution' equal to the market value of
the product").
96. Am. Acad. of Family Physicians v. United States, 91 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 (8th Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 1159.
98. See, e.g., Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 107, 119; Tex. Farm Bureau v. United States, 53
F.3d 120, 123-25 (5th Cir. 1995); Nat'l Water Well Ass'n v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 75 (1989); Prof I Ins.
Agents of Mich. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 246 (1982), affd, 726 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984). For example, in
National Water Well Association, the Tax Court held that dividends received by a tax-exempt organiza-
tion in connection with an insurance program was trade or business income where the organization
agreed to (1) provide assistance to the insurance company in promoting, endorsing and sponsoring the
program, (2) make known the availability of the program to the organization's members, (3) exclusively
use the insurance company for its program and not sponsor or endorse the programs of any other insur-
ance company, and (4) provide extensive administrative services in connection with the program,
including facilitating the collection of premiums by providing the insurance company with member
information. 92 T.C. at 92-94.
99. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
100. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2006).
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quency and continuity with which the activities are conducted 01 and the
manner in which the activities are pursued.102 In general, a business activ-
ity is regularly carried on if the activity is conducted with a frequency,
continuity, and manner similar to comparable commercial activities.
103
"Income producing or fund raising activities lasting only a short period of
time [are] not ordinarily... treated as regularly carried on if they recur
only occasionally or sporadically," and are not regarded as regularly carried
on "merely because they are conducted on an annually recurrent basis."'
104
Furthermore, in determining whether a charity's business activities are
"regularly carried on," the activities of the charity's agents may be taken
101. Neither the Treasury regulations nor the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sierra Club consider
whether "specific business activities" should be defined broadly or narrowly when determining whether
a set of specific business activities is "regularly carried on." Nevertheless, these authorities suggest that
specific business activities should be defined narrowly, distinguishing between distinct subclasses of the
same general activities. The Treasury regulations state that the regularly carried on requirement "must
be applied in light of the purpose of the unrelated business income tax to place exempt organization
business activities upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they
compete." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1983). Arguably, this purpose is best served by
defining activities narrowly. A charity with a broad range of disparate business activities (that collec-
tively are "regularly carried on," but individually are not) does not represent a competitive threat to any
taxable enterprise.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1).
103. Id. For example, "[w]here income producing activities are of a kind normally conducted by
nonexempt commercial organizations on a year-round basis, the conduct of such activities by an exempt
organization over a period of only a few weeks does not constitute the regular carrying on of trade or
business." Id. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i). Similarly, "income producing or fund raising activities lasting only a
short period of time will not ordinarily be treated as regularly carried on if they recur only occasionally
or sporadically." Id. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii); see also id. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i) ("Where income producing
activities are of a kind normally undertaken by nonexempt commercial organizations only on a seasonal
basis, the conduct of such activities by an exempt organization during a significant portion of the season
ordinarily constitutes the regular conduct of trade or business."). In making this determination, it is
essential to identify the appropriate nonexempt commercial counterpart to the exempt organization's
activity, because the manner in which the nonexempt commercial counterpart conducts its similar
activities has an important bearing on whether the activity is considered to be carried on year-round, on
a seasonal basis or intermittently. For example, a tax-exempt organization's annual Christmas card sales
program was determined to be regularly carried on when conducted over several months during the
holiday season because, although nonexempt organizations normally conduct the sale of greeting cards
year-round, the Christmas card portion of the nonexempt organizations' sales was conducted over the
same seasonal period. Veterans of Foreign Wars, Dep't of Mich. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 7, 32-37 (1987).
By contrast, when an exempt organization's fundraising activities are conducted on an intermittent
basis, such activities are generally considered not to be regularly carried on. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-
I (c)(2)(iii) (stating that fundraising activities lasting only a short period of time will generally not be
regarded as regularly carried on, despite their recurrence or their manner of conduct); Suffolk County
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1314 (1981), acq., 1984-2 C.B. 2 (determining that
the conduct of an annual vaudeville show one weekend per year and the solicitation and publication of
advertising in the related program guide which lasted eight to sixteen weeks per year was intermittent
and not regularly carried on.). Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii) ("[E]xempt organization business
activities which are engaged in only discontinuously or periodically will not be considered regularly




into account. 105 Courts and the Internal Revenue Service disagree as to
whether a charity's preparation time in organizing and developing an in-
come-producing activity may be taken into account. 106
3. Substantially Related Requirement
If a charity's trade or business activity is determined to be regularly
carried on, the next inquiry is whether such activity is substantially related
to the organization's charitable, educational, or other purpose constituting
the basis for its exemption from federal income tax.107 A trade or business
is a "related business" if the "conduct of the business activities has [a]
causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes (other than
through the production of income)."' 108 It is important to emphasize that
mere production of income from the activity to enable the charity to carry
out its charitable activities is not enough to justify the activity as substan-
tially related to the charity's exempt purposes. The causal relationship must
be substantial in that the business activity must contribute importantly to
the accomplishment of the organization's exempt purposes.10 9 This in an
inherently factual determination. 1 10
For example, the American Red Cross, a charity organized to provide
emergency relief to those in need, sells a Ready-to-Go Emergency Prepar-
edness Kit containing all the essentials that may be needed in an emer-
gency. 11' The American Red Cross reports the revenues from the sale of
105. State Police Ass'n of Mass. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1996), affd, 125 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 1997).
106. See NCAA v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 456 (1989) (finding that NCAA's sale of advertisements for
annual championship program was "regularly carried on," in part because of the amount of preliminary
time spent to solicit advertisements and prepare them for publication), rev'd, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that this activity was not regularly carried on, because only the time spent conducting
the activity, not the time spent in preparations, is relevant to that determination), action on dec., 1991-
015 (July 3, 1991) (indicating that the Internal Revenue Service will continue to litigate the issue).
107. See I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2).
109. Id.
110. For example, in Revenue Ruling 78-145, the Internal Revenue Service held that the sale of
plasma by a tax- exempt organization engaged in collecting and maintaining blood products for use by
hospitals for red blood cell transfusion was related to the blood bank's exempt purposes where the
blood bank sold by-product plasma from which red blood cells had been removed for the hospitals' use
and plasma salvaged from blood nearing the end of its shelf life. Rev. Rul. 78-145, 1978-1 C.B. 169. By
contrast, the sale of plasma obtained from donors through a procedure by which the red blood cells
were already removed and replaced in the donors was determined not to be related to the blood bank's
exempt purposes because such plasma was obtained solely for resale. Id.
11. Katie Lawson, Red Cross Ready-to-Go Kit Quick to Receive National Recognition (Jan. 23,
2008),
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem. I aOl 9a978f421296e8 I ec89e43181 aa0/?vgnextoid=66
9022daedd4b I 1OVgnVCM 10000089I87aRCRD&vgnextfnt--default.
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these first aid kits as exempt from its UBTI because the sale of first aid kits
is substantially related to the organization's mission of emergency response
and preparedness."l 2 If the same first aid kits were sold by a natural history
museum, it would be difficult to find a causal relationship between the sale
of the first aid kits and the museum's purpose to educate the public about
natural history. Therefore, the revenues from the sale of the first aid kits by
the natural history museum would be included in the museum's UBTI.
4. Relevant Exceptions
If the activity in question is considered to be an unrelated trade or
business under general principles, certain relevant statutory exceptions
may, if applicable, still allow the charity to exclude from the charity's
UBTI any payments it receives from the activity.1 3 The statutory excep-
tions and modifications to the UBTI treatment of a charity's income-
producing activities attempt to exempt those income-producing activities
that are passive in nature or conducted in such a manner as to not pose any
competitive threat to for-profit entities. For cause-related marketing alli-
ances, two statutory exceptions are particularly relevant. The first exception
relates to qualified sponsorship payments, 114 and the second exception
relates to royalties received by the charity. 115 The next two sections discuss
these exceptions in more detail and provide relevant historical background
for these exceptions as they might apply to cause-related marketing alli-
ances.
B. College Bowl Games Kick Off the Debate
Preceding the enactment of the qualified sponsorship rules, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service issued a private ruling concerning the display of a
corporate sponsor's name or logo in return for the sponsorship of a colle-
giate football game, 116 which has come to be known as the "Mobil Cotton
Bowl Letter."'1 17 In the Mobil Cotton Bowl Letter, the Internal Revenue
Service considered benefits afforded to Mobil Oil Company as the sponsor
of the Cotton Bowl collegiate football game and to John Hancock Insur-
112. See, e.g., American National Red Cross Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From
Income Tax, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2008, at p. 8, available at www.guidestar.org.
113. See generally I.R.C. §§ 512-513 (providing for certain exceptions and modifications to the
determination of a charity's UBTI).
114. SeelR.C. § 513(a).
115. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(5).
116. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991); see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007
(Aug. 16, 1991).
117. See Wirtschafter, supra note 27, at 1465.
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
ance as the sponsor of the Sun Bowl collegiate football game. 118 Under the
sponsorship agreements, the corporate sponsor designed the game's name
and logo, which included the corporate sponsor's name and logo. 19 The
game logo was used in all "official uses," including, but not limited to,
identification, advertising, pennants, promotional material, and official use
of the game's name on television, on the radio and in the print media.
120
The logo also appeared in the stadium and on the player's uniforms. 121 The
Internal Revenue Service ruled that the sponsorship payments to the ex-
empt organization operating the sporting event constituted UBTI because
the corporate sponsor was receiving advertising benefits. 122 The Internal
Revenue Service considered the benefits to Mobil Oil Company and John
Hancock Insurance to entail much more than mere recognition of the spon-
sor's generosity (which would not result in UBTI). 1
23
The position of the Internal Revenue Service on the UBTI treatment of
the corporate sponsor's payments in the Mobil Cotton Bowl Letter led to a
heated debate on the appropriate treatment of sponsorship payments. 124
Taken to its extreme, the Mobil Cotton Bowl Letter would prevent public
recognition of sponsors of libraries, academic chairs, museum wings, pub-
lic radio, and little league associations unless the charity was willing to
treat the sponsorship money received as UBTI. 125 In the face of backlash
from the charitable community, the Internal Revenue Service softened its
position on the UBTI treatment of corporate sponsorship payments and
issued proposed audit guidelines that sought to distinguish between inci-
dental donor recognition and taxable advertising services. 126 These pro-
posed audit guidelines would have exempted most corporate sponsorship
118. Charles T. Crawford, IRS Softens Its Position on Sponsorship as Advertising, 79 J. TAX'N 214,
214(1993).
119. See id.; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007.
120. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007.
121. Wirtschafter, supra note 27, at 1476.
122. Id. at 1465.
123. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007. One author notes that John Hancock Insurance re-
ceived over $5 million worth of publicity in exchange for its $1 million sponsorship fee and $600,000
advertising cost for the John Hancock Bowl in 1991. Crawford, supra note 118, at 214. An officer of
John Hancock commented: "'The bowl is an extraordinarily efficient media buy. It would cost us a
great deal more money to help influence sales by normal advertising."' DENNIS ZIMMERMAN,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS No. 92-157E, CORPORATE TITLE
SPONSORSHIP PAYMENTS TO NONPROFIT COLLEGE FOOTBALL GAMES: SHOULD THEY BE TAXED? 8
(1992).
124. See, e.g., Wirtschafter, supra note 27, at 1487-93 (describing the controversy between the
Internal Revenue Service and the charitable community); Crawford, supra note 118, at 214 (noting the
enormous potential adverse effect of the Mobil Cotton Bowl ruling on the charitable community, which
at that time received over $1.1 billion annually in sponsorship fees).
125. See Crawford, supra note 118, at 215.
126. Id. at214.
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arrangements from UBTI treatment, but would have captured college bowl
games. 127 The following year, the Internal Revenue Service further sof-
tened its position and issued proposed regulations that would also exclude
sponsorship of most college bowl game arrangements from UBTI treat-
ment. 128 The proposed regulations were issued in the face of Congress
approving a provision (in a bill that was later vetoed) exempting qualified
sponsorship payments received in connection with "qualified athletic
events" from UBTI treatment. 1
29
The culmination of this debate was the enactment of an exemption
from UBTI for certain corporate sponsorship payments. Under section
513(i) of the Internal Revenue Code, the receipt of qualified sponsorship
payments by a charity does not constitute the receipt of income from an
unrelated trade or business, and instead, the payment is treated as a charita-
ble contribution to the charity. 130 A "qualified sponsorship payment" is
"any payment' 3' by any person engaged in a trade or business with respect
to which there is no arrangement or expectation that the person will receive
any substantial return benefit."' 132 A "substantial return benefit" is any
benefit other than a "use or acknowledgement" 133 of the corporate sponsor
and certain disregarded benefits.134 Substantial benefits include the charita-
127. Id. at 214-15.
128. Id. at 215.
129. See Revenue Act of 1992, H.R. 11, 102d Cong. § 7303 (1992).
130. I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(a) (2002). The Treasury Regulations provide the
following example of a qualified sponsorship payment:
M, a local charity, organizes a marathon and walkathon at which it serves to participants
drinks and other refreshments provided free of charge by a national corporation. The corpora-
tion also gives M prizes to be awarded to the winners of the event. M recognizes the assis-
tance of the corporation by listing the corporation's name in promotional fliers, in newspaper
advertisements of the event and on T-shirts worn by participants. M changes the name of its
event to include the name of the corporation. M's activities constitute acknowledgement of
the sponsorship.
Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 1.
13 1. "Payment" means "the payment of money, transfer of property, or performance of services."
Id. § 1.513-4(c)(1).
132. Id. For purposes of these rules, it is irrelevant whether the sponsored activity is temporary or
permanent. Id.
133. The permitted "uses or acknowledgements" under the qualified sponsorship payment rules
include (i) "logos and slogans that do not contain qualitative or comparative descriptions of the payor's
products, services, facilities or company," (ii) "a list of the payor's locations, telephone numbers, or
Internet address," (iii) "value-neutral descriptions, including displays or visual depictions, of the
payor's product-line or services," and (iv) "the payor's brand or trade names and product or service
listings." Id. § 1.513-4(c)(1)(iv). "Logos or slogans that are an established part of the payor's identity
are not considered to contain qualitative or comparative descriptions." Id.
134. Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2). A benefit is disregarded if "the aggregate fair market value of all the
benefits provided to the payor or persons designated by the payor in connection with the payment
during the organization's taxable year is not more than two percent of the amount of the payment." Id.
§ 1.513-4(c)(2)(ii). If this limit is exceeded, the entire benefit (and not just the amount exceeding the
two percent threshold) provided to the payor is a substantial return benefit. Id.
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ble organization's provision of facilities, services, or other privileges to the
sponsor; exclusive provider relationships; 135 and any license to use intangi-
ble assets of the charitable organization. 136 "If there is an arrangement or
expectation that the payor will receive a substantial return benefit with
respect to any payment, then only the portion, if any, of the payment that
exceeds the fair market value of the substantial return benefit is a qualified
sponsorship payment."' 137 The exempt organization has the burden of estab-
lishing the fair market value of the substantial return benefit. 131 If the or-
ganization fails to do so, "no portion of the payment constitutes a qualified
sponsorship payment."1
39
The tax treatment of any payment that does not represent income from
a qualified sponsorship payment is governed by general UBTI princi-
ples. 140 The mere fact that the payments are received in connection with the
corporate sponsor receiving a substantial return benefit does not necessitate
the payments constituting UBTI. For example, in a memorandum released
by the Internal Revenue Service in October 2001, examples of certain ex-
clusive provider relationships were addressed. 141 Significantly, one exam-
ple involved a contract between a soft drink company and a university,
under which the soft drink company would be the exclusive provider of
soft drinks on campus in return for an annual payment made to the univer-
sity. 14 2 Exclusive provider relationships are explicitly named as a substan-
tial return benefit; therefore, the arrangement did not qualify as a qualified
sponsorship payment. Because the soft drink company maintained the
vending machines, there was no obligation by the university to perform any
services on behalf of the soft drink company or to perform any services in
connection with the contract. 143 Accordingly, the university did not have
the level of activity necessary to constitute a trade or business. Since the
contract also provided that the soft drink company was given a license to
market its products using the university's name and logo, the portion of the
135. The Treasury Regulations define an "exclusive provider" relationship as any arrangement
which "limits the sale, distribution, availability, or use of competing products, services or facilities in
connection with an exempt organization's activity." Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(vi)(13). "For example, if in
exchange for a payment, the exempt organization agrees to allow only the payor's products to be sold in
connection with an activity, the payor has received a substantial return benefit." Id.
136. Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii)(D).
137. Id. § 1.513-4(d).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 1.513-4(f).
141. See IRS Issues Field Memo on Exclusive Providers and UBIT, 2001 TAx NOTES TODAY 192-
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total payment attributable to the value of the license would be excluded
from the university's UBTI as a royalty payment.
144
C. Affinity Cards Pave the Way
Because royalties are passive in nature, the receipt of royalty income
by a tax-exempt organization does not result in unfair competition with
taxable entities. 145 Accordingly, section 512 of the Internal Revenue Code
provides that a charity's UBTI generally does not include royalties. 146 A
royalty is defined as a payment that relates to the use of a valuable right,
such as a name, trademark, trade name, or copyright. 147 The royalty may be
in the form of a fixed fee or a percentage of sales of the products bearing
the charity's name and logo. In addition, the tax-exempt organization may
retain the right to approve the use of its name or logo without changing the
determination that the income from the transaction is a royalty. By contrast,
the payment for personal services does not constitute a royalty.
14 8
The application of the royalty exclusion to the licensing of a charity's
name and logo to a for-profit company for inclusion on the company's
product was first tested in the affinity card context. Generally, an affinity
credit card arrangement provides that a credit card company may use the
exempt organization's name in connection with a credit card, and the or-
ganization will receive a certain percentage, or "royalty," from the income
generated by the credit card.149 There seems to be little doubt that the pay-
ment to an exempt organization solely for the use of the organization's
name constitutes a royalty.150 The problem, however, in the affinity credit
144. Id. The exclusion for royalties received by an exempt organization is discussed in Part II.C,
infra.
145. See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1533 (9th Cir. 1996); Yamamoto, supra note
84, at 268-69 ("The allowance for excluding passive sources of income from the UBIT was due to
Congress's belief that such sources of income would not take the organization any time to run and not
create a serious threat to for-profit businesses.").
146. I.R.C. § 512(b)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(b) (as amended in 1992). A charity's
UBTI would include royalties derived from debt-financed property. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(b).
147. Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 84, at 225-26; see also Sierra Club, 86 F.3d 1526 (example
of typical affinity card arrangement). In Sierra Club, the Sierra Club entered into an agreement with
American Bankcard Services for American Bankcard Services to offer to Sierra Club members a Visa
or Mastercard which bore Sierra Club's name on the front and logo on the back. Id. at 1528. In ex-
change for the use of its name and logo, Sierra Club would receive a monthly royalty equal to 1.5
percent of total Sierra Club cardholder purchases. Id.
150. See Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135, situation 1. For example, fees paid to an exempt
organization by vendors who sold souvenirs bearing the organization's name and logo constituted
royalty income exempt from UBTI. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-21-049 (Feb. 23, 1998); see also Yama-
moto, supra note 84, at 292-95 (concurring with the practice of treating income received from the
license of a charity's name and logo for inclusion on an affinity card as a royalty).
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card context is that these arrangements typically include the use of the or-
ganization's mailing list as well. The Internal Revenue Service formerly
challenged the exclusion of revenues from affinity card arrangements from
UBTI, asserting that (i) payments for the use of an organization's mailing
list constitute payments for services, and (ii) payments for the use of both
an organization's name and mailing list, pursuant to the same agreement,
may not be segregated. The Internal Revenue Service argued that the entire
payment fails the royalty test and is UBTI, even though part of the payment
is clearly for the organization's endorsement. 151 In Sierra Club Inc. v.
Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Internal
Revenue Service's aggregation argument and analyzed the income received
from the use of the organization's name and the use of the mailing list
separately. 152
Of particular importance in the royalty context is the amount of ser-
vices the charity performs in exchange for the payment received. In order
to maintain the royalty exemption for the payments received, the charity
may not perform more than de minimus services in connection with the
arrangement. 153 If the charity performs too many services, then the pay-
ment is instead considered compensation for personal services and no
longer qualifies as a passive royalty.154 As a result, the payments received
are typically included in the charity's UBTI.
While there is little guidance on the types of services permitted in
connection with royalties for the use of a charity's name or logo, the case
law discussing the types of permitted services in the mailing list context is
instructive. The Tax Court has repeatedly held that payments received by a
tax-exempt organization from the rental of its mailing list to third parties
constitute "royalties," at least where the organization does not provide an-
cillary services to the payor. 155 The Claims Court has adopted a less favor-
able position. 156 In DA VI, the charity, Disabled American Veterans, took a
very active role in developing and promoting its mailing list through quasi-
151. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-21-005 (Feb. 23, 1993) (where the Internal Revenue Service ruled
that the mailing list rental "subsumed" the other aspects of the affinity card agreement); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-06-030 (Nov. 18, 1992) (revoking I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-20-054 (Feb. 20, 1992)); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 92-22-001 (Sept. 30, 1991).
152. Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1536.
153. Id. at 1533-35.
154. Id.
155. See Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332 (1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458 (1997); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582 (1993),
a~ff'd in relevant part, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996); Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r (DA V I1), 94
T.C. 60 (1990), rev'don other grounds, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991).
156. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States (DAVI), 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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commercial means. The charity joined the Direct Marketing Association,
"regularly attended meetings and conventions where persons interested in
direct mail matters assemble," and augmented its own list by renting other
organizations' lists and mailing trinkets to potential donors from those
lists.157 Conversely, the charity augmented its income by renting its list to
other organizations, taking an active role in that process. In renting the
names on its donor list, the charity followed the usual trade practice of the
direct mail industry.158 The court concluded that "DAV's list rentals are the
product of extensive business activity by DAV and do not fit within the
types of 'passive' income set forth in section 512(b)."' 159 Therefore, the
court held that the charity's income from these rentals could not be classi-
fied as "royalties."
The continued vitality of DA V I is uncertain. The Tax Court refused
to follow DA V I when considering essentially the same facts for different
tax years in DA V II.160 Furthermore, DA VI can be distinguished from cases
in which the exempt organization itself does nothing more than provide its
list to a third party. For example, in Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals contrasted the activities of the Sierra Club with those of the Dis-
abled American Veterans:
Here, Sierra Club contracted with others to perform those services that
the Court of Claims held constituted 'extensive business activity' in DA V
L The government argues that it does not matter that Sierra Club paid
others to perform services such as sorting by zip code and providing the
names on labels-Sierra Club was still in the business of selling and
marketing its mailing lists. Sierra Club, on the other hand, correctly
points out that it did not participate in any of the business activities that
could be considered providing services. It did not market its lists, sort the
lists, provide the lists on labels, or provide any other service to the list
users. Nor did it pay [a contractor] to perform these services. [The con-
tactor] billed [subcontractors] for these services, who in turn billed the
157. Id. at 1182-83.
158. Id. at 1184. According to the DA VI court:
To obviate the need for the responsible DAV official to devote a substantial portion of his
time to responding to inquiries concerning DAV' s list rental terms, "rate cards" were pre-
pared and sent to those list brokers who had previously arranged rentals from the DAV's list.
Rates were set by DAV on a level consistent with the rates which DAV was then paying to
rent lists from other organizations. The "rate cards" DAV sent to list brokers set forth the
various rates charged by DAV (per 1,000 names), the additional charges applicable for vari-
ous selections (such as by zip code or by recent donors), the form in which the names could
be made available (such as on magnetic tape or on heat transfer, gummed or Cheshire labels),
and the number of names available in various categories.
Id. (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 1189.




Similarly, in a subsequent case, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
activities of certain tax-exempt alumni associations in exploiting their mail-
ing lists (through an affinity credit card program), from the more extensive
activities of the Disabled American Veterans:
Unlike the exempt institution in [DA VI and DA VII], the alumni associa-
tions did not follow the usual practices of the direct mail industry in rent-
ing its mailing list, did not regularly rent the list out, and did not use
thousands of hours of staff time to administer rentals.... The Tax Court
found that the few telephone responses to members regarding the credit
cards were "de minimis and were done to protect petitioner's goodwill
with its members," a finding well supported in the record. 
162
The court's decision also clarified that "the royalty exclusion cannot
be an all-or-nothing proposition," and rejected the Service's contention that
"even a little bit of service taints all the royalties. '163
Still, in Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that excludable
royalties are typically passive in nature and explained that the passivity
requirement is consistent with the overall treatment of UBTI. 164 The main
purpose behind enactment of the UBTI provisions was to prevent an unfair
advantage when tax-exempt organizations compete with for-profit enti-
ties. 165 Congress excluded certain income from UBTI, such as royalties,
since their passive nature is not likely to result in unfair competition with
the for-profit counterparts. 166 The court clarified that excludable royalties
involved the payment for the use of a property right, but that a payment for
services performed by the property owner in conjunction with that use
would not be considered excludable royalty income. 167
In Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit did not discuss whether the ser-
vices performed by the charity in connection with the use of the charity's
161. Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1535-36 (9th Cir. 1996).
162. Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comn'r, 193 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 1999).
163. Id. at 1101; but see Tex. Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that where an exempt organization provided an insurance company with office space, stationary, post-
age, secretarial and clerical help, office supplies, furniture, and equipment to promote and administer
the insurance company's business, the exempt organization could not as an "afterthought" characterize
a portion of its revenue from this arrangement as royalties for the use of the exempt organization's
name).
164. Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1533-34.
165. Id. at 1533.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 1532.
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name or logo on the affinity card would preclude royalty treatment for the
affinity card payments and remanded the case to the Tax Court for further
findings of fact on this issue. In a subsequent case, however, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that royalty treatment was appropriate when the charity
performed a de minimus amount of services in connection with the affinity
card arrangement. 168 The Tax Court has also held in several cases that a de
minimus amount of services provided would not preclude royalty treatment
for the use of an organization's name or logo in the affinity credit card
context. 169 Based on such cases, the Internal Revenue Manual now indi-
cates that the Internal Revenue Service will consider payments under affin-
ity credit card arrangements royalties as long as only minimal services are
provided by the exempt organization's members or employees. 1
70
More recently, the Internal Revenue Service privately ruled that royal-
ties received by a charity from the license of the charity's intellectual prop-
erty to a for-profit company for use in the company's commercial activities
were excluded from the charity's UBTI under the royalty exception.
17 1
Under the license agreement, the charity retained the right to review the
designs and proposed uses of the charity's intellectual property, inspect the
commercial counterpart's facilities where the product was manufactured,
and inspect the commercial counterpart's books and records annually.
172
The Internal Revenue Service determined that these services performed by
the charity in connection with the licensing arrangement were de mini-
mus. 173 Moreover, the licensing agreement was narrowly tailored to protect
the charity's ownership of its intellectual property by giving the charity
absolute discretion to reject proposed uses of the property, providing notice
on every unit displaying the charity's mark that it was used with the char-
ity's permission, and allowing the charity to approve and limit mass media
advertising of the product.174 The Internal Revenue Service concluded that
168. Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
169. See Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332 (1999); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1569 (1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458 (1997).
170. See I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.27.6.7.3 (CCH 1999) ("The Service's adminis-
trative approach in the area of affinity credit cards is that affinity card cases should be resolved in a
manner consistent with existing court cases. In the cases decided in favor of the taxpayer, the facts
showed that the involvement of the exempt organization was relatively minimal, and the organizations
generally hired outside contractors to perform most services associated with exploitation of the use of
intangible property. Thus, courts concluded that the payment was for the intangible property rather than
for services of the organization's members or employees. In the one case decided in favor of the gov-
ernment-[DA V /]-the organization's employees provided extensive services in connection with the
list rental.").






the income that the charity would receive from the arrangement was "vastly
out of proportion with the time and effort" the charity would expend.
175
Therefore, it could only be compensation for the use of the charity's intel-
lectual property. 176
D. Beyond Affinity Cards into Uncharted Territory
Based on the success of the taxpayer in establishing royalty treatment
for the use of a charity's name or logo in the affinity card cases, at first
blush it would appear that similar treatment would be automatically af-
forded to the payments received for the use of a charity's name or logo in
cause-related marketing alliances. Upon closer examination, however, im-
portant distinctions between affinity cards and cause-related marketing
alliances appear which may significantly impact the unrelated business
income tax treatment of cause-related marketing alliances. First, as a fun-
damental matter, the affinity card cases establish only that a charity may
perform an insubstantial amount of services in connection with the ar-
rangement and still receive royalty treatment. The question of what services
are substantial still remains. Second, consumer perception of apparent en-
dorsement of the product bearing the charity's name or logo was not preva-
lent in the affinity card context, but is an issue for cause-related marketing
alliances. Thus, a question arises: if a charity allows its name or logo to be
used in a manner that consumers perceive to be an apparent endorsement of
the product, should the payments the charity receives from the cause-
related marketing alliance be treated as advertising revenue rather than
royalties? Third, many cause-related marketing alliances involve the sale of
the branded merchandise by the charity itself; in the affinity card context,
charities did not market the affinity cards. Thus, to the extent the charity is
engaged in active sales of the branded merchandise, the charity cannot rely
on the royalty exception to exclude the revenues it receives from those
sales from the charity's UBTI. Finally, cause-related marketing alliances
generally involve prominent recognition by the charity of the corporate
partner on the charity's website and in print materials. Such recognition can
further complicate the analysis of the appropriate UBTI classification of the
revenue from the cause-related marketing alliance.
This section discusses the possible unrelated business tax treatment of
income received from cause-related marketing based on existing law and
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addressed using a general UBTI analysis. Second, the income received by
the charity in the form of a "royalty" from the sale of branded merchandise
or promotional merchandise by the corporate partner is analyzed under the
application of the corporate sponsorship rules and the royalty exception. In
addition, consideration is given to whether the income could be treated as
advertising income, and thus subject to inclusion in the charity's UBTI
under existing law. This analysis reveals that existing guidance is conflict-
ing, and it leads to unpredictable and uncertain results. Therefore, I con-
clude this section with a call for Internal Revenue Service safe harbor
guidance which specifically takes into account the unique nature of cause-
related marketing activities.
1. Sales of Branded Merchandise Conducted Directly by the Charity
A charity which directly sells merchandise bearing the charity's name,
logo, or other cause-related message would analyze whether the receipts
from the sale of such merchandise are UBTI under the general three-prong
UBTI test. 177 The sale of branded merchandise typically is an activity car-
ried on for the production of income from the sale of goods. By way of
example, the annual sale of Christmas cards has been considered a trade or
business,178 as has the isolated publication, sale, and distribution of a single
book. 179 Additionally, a charity would normally engage in the sales of the
branded merchandise continuously throughout the year.180 Accordingly, the
sale of branded merchandise would be considered a regularly carried on
trade or business. Whether the receipts from the sale of branded merchan-
dise are UBTI would depend on whether the sale of the merchandise is
substantially related to the charity's exempt purpose.
Where a charity sells merchandise, the merchandise is examined on an
item-by-item basis to determine if sales of such merchandise further the
organization's exempt purposes. 181 Generally, if the primary purpose of an
item is utilitarian, ornamental, or token, selling such an item is not substan-
tially related to the organization's exempt purposes. 182 In contrast, if the
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. See Veterans of Foreign Wars, Dep't of Mich. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 7 (1987).
179. See Rev. Rul. 69-430, 1969-2 C.B. 129.
180. See Robert A. Wexler & Alice M. Anderson, Internet Guidance Should Reconcile Old Law
With a New Medium, 12 J. TAX'N EXEMPT ORGS. 187, 183 (2001) ("If the storefront remains on line on
an ongoing basis, it will almost always be an activity that is regularly carried on. In these situations, the
issue will likely turn on whether the items sold are substantially related to the organization's exempt
purpose.").
181. See e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-20-002 (Nov. 26, 1996).
182. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rol 2002-22-030 (Mar. 4, 2002); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-24-
111 (Jan. 3, 1980).
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utilitarian aspects of the item are incidental to the item's relationship to the
organization's exempt purpose, the sale of such an item is considered to be
substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose.183 In addition,
merely placing an exempt organization's name or logo on an item other-
wise unrelated to its exempt purpose will not prevent sales proceeds from
constituting UBTI. 184 However, in several private rulings, the Internal
Revenue Service has reached the contrary conclusion regarding the sale of
t-shirts and similar items bearing an organization's name or symbol when
additional facts indicated that the sales furthered the organization's exempt
purpose. 18
5
In one private ruling issued in 1986, the Internal Revenue Service
ruled that the sale of t-shirts and other items depicting a hand washing
symbol to health care facilities such as hospitals, day-care centers, and
nursing homes, and to individuals through pharmacies, advanced a char-
ity's exempt purposes by disseminating information about the importance
of hand washing.186 The primary purpose of the organization was to im-
prove the health care provided to children and others in hospitals, day-care
centers, and nursing homes, and to educate the public about the need for
cleanliness in caring for the sick. 187 In particular, the organization focused
on the importance of hand washing as a means of preventing infection.
188
The organization disseminated its message through the sale of posters,
coloring books, t-shirts, and buttons that displayed the organization's hand
washing symbol and text message. 189 The organization sold the items to
hospitals and other institutions dealing with children and to the general
public through pharmacies. 190 The Internal Revenue Service found that the
sale of these items did not result in UBTI. 191
In another private ruling issued in 1993, the Internal Revenue Service
considered an exempt organization's sale of t-shirts, caps, and other items
183. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-05-002 (Sept. 4, 1985); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-28-009
(Mar. 30, 1983).
184. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-26-003 (Nov. 17, 1982).
185. Private letter rulings are directed only to the taxpayers to whom they are addressed and may
not be used or cited as precedent by other taxpayers. I.R.C. § 61 10(k)(3) (2006). Furthermore, the
Internal Revenue Service is not bound by the position it takes in a particular private letter ruling and is
free to reach the contrary conclusion for another taxpayer under a similar set of facts. Nonetheless,
private letter rulings may be relied upon by a taxpayer to establish substantial authority for the tax
treatment of an item reported on a return. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003).
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bearing the organization's name and logo. 192 The exempt organization's
functions were related to law enforcement and included the promotion of
fraternalism among its members and the improvement of its members'
working conditions. 193 The organization sold the items to organization
members and nonmembers, but most purchasing nonmembers worked for
the organization. 194 Members were offered the items at cost, while non-
members paid a higher price to cover the administrative costs of selling to
nonmembers. 195 The Internal Revenue Service concluded that the t-shirt
and other sales encouraged fratemalism among the organization's members
by promoting identification of, commitment of, and friendship among its
members, so that such sales were substantially related to the organization's
exempt purposes and did not result in UBTI. 196
Most recently, the Internal Revenue Service privately ruled in 2007
that the sale of merchandise bearing the symbol for breast cancer awareness
by a charity formed to educate the general public about early detection of
breast cancer was substantially related to the charity's exempt purpose.
197
Thus, the proceeds from the sale of the breast cancer awareness branded
merchandise were excluded from the charity's UBTI.198 The branded mer-
chandise described in the ruling included pins, apparel, home and office
products, jewelry, and special gifts. 199 All branded merchandise either dis-
played a pink ribbon, the universal symbol for breast cancer awareness, or
were the color pink, the universal color for breast cancer awareness.
200
Included with the packaging of each item was a bookmark providing the
charity's recommended three-step approach to positive breast health and
the charity's toll-free number and web address. 20 1 The Internal Revenue
Service concluded that the sale of the branded merchandise "reminds and
encourages those who wear, display, or see the images, about breast cancer.
The sale of these items further enhances [the charity's] message that early
detection of breast cancer and positive breast health practice save lives and
is, accordingly, related to the organization's exempt purposes.
' '202
Even though the branded merchandise sold by a charity typically has













some utilitarian value, such as a t-shirt, hat, wristband, or pin, it appears
that if the charity carefully links the sale of the branded merchandise to the
spreading of the charity's message, the sale of the branded merchandise
would be considered substantially related to the charity's exempt pur-
pose.203 Disseminating the charity's message through the sale of branded
merchandise bearing the charity's message in text or symbol form (i) pro-
motes thought and discussion of the charity's message, and (ii) enhances
the circulation of this message through a rather remarkable display of
grassroots public support. 204 The link between the sale of the branded mer-
chandise and the dissemination of the charity's message is often enhanced
by including in the individual merchandise packaging an educational bro-
chure explaining the message that the charity is trying to promote.
205
The charity's position would be significantly weakened if the charity's
primary purpose in selling branded merchandise is to generate income. For
example, in the 1970s, Disabled American Veterans conducted a fundrais-
ing campaign which offered donors certain low-cost items known as "pre-
miums," such as books, maps, and wrist-watch calendars, in exchange for a
specified contribution to the charity.206 In DA VI, the court cast the transac-
tions as the outright sale of the premiums and determined the income from
203. Conducting sales through a third-party vendor should not change this result. The Internal
Revenue Service has accepted that appropriately conducted sales of certain items to the public through
unrelated retailers do not result in UBTI. In Technical Advice Memorandum 95-50-003, the Internal
Revenue Service considered whether a museum received UBTI by selling a variety of items in its on-
site stores, wholesale to retailers and gift stores, and by mail order. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-50-003
(Sept. 18, 1995). The items sold included books about the historical period the museum covered, period
toys, and exhibit reproductions, among other things. In determining whether UBTI resulted from the
sale of these items, the Internal Revenue Service focused almost exclusively on the nature of the items
sold, and concluded that sales of those items did not result in UBTI, whether sold on-site or through
retailers. The only issue raised by the sales to retail stores and gift shops was whether the sales were
conducted on a larger scale than was reasonably necessary for the performance of the museum's exempt
functions. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1983).
204. See Hassay & Peloza, supra note 2, at 38 (noting that the purchase of branded merchandise
provides supporters of the charity "with a more visible, symbolic statement about their identification
with the organization and or cause. Moreover, these purchases are often used as 'badges' that allow
supporters to define themselves in public.").
205. In Technical Advice Memorandum 91-38-003, the Internal Revenue Service considered
whether a historic estate's retail and wholesale sales of flowers and plants to florists and garden centers
constituted UBTI. I.R.S. Tee. Adv. Mem. 91-38-003 (June 24, 1991). Although the Internal Revenue
Service concluded that UBTI did result from the wholesale activity based on the facts presented, it
noted, "where educational and other similar descriptive materials concerning the exempt purposes of
the [charity] accompany the plant item at the point of sale, it is our view that such sales would be
substantially related to exempt purposes." Id.; see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-28-009 (Mar. 30,
1983) (reasoning that the sale of early American period pieces by a museum may contribute importantly
to the accomplishment of the museum's exempt purposes if such items are sold with descriptive litera-
ture explaining their historical or artistic significance).
206. DA VI, 650 F.2d 1178, 1183 (Ct. CI. 1981).
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some of the sales to be UBTI. 207 Disabled American Veterans argued that
the sales of the premiums were related to its exempt purpose because the
inclusion of the premiums in solicitation letters drew attention to the letters,
which explained the charity's mission and objectives. 208 The court rejected
this argument, noting that Disabled American Veterans initiated the pre-
mium program in an effort to increase contributions and discontinued the
program when it was no longer an effective revenue-producer. 209 Accord-
ingly, the only causal relationship between the premium program and the
accomplishment of Disabled American Veterans' exempt purposes was the
production of income for those purposes, 210 which is explicitly excluded as
a sufficient relationship.
2 11
Internal Revenue Service interest in the sales of the branded merchan-
dise may increase as the scope and extent of sales increase. The Treasury
Regulations provide that "[iln determining whether activities contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose, the size and ex-
tent of the activities involved must be considered in relation to the nature
and extent of the exempt function which they purport to serve. ' 212 There-
fore,
where income is realized by an exempt organization from activities that
are in part related to the performance of its exempt functions, but which
are conducted on a larger scale than is reasonably necessary for perform-
ance of such functions, [the gross income] of the activities in excess of
the needs of the exempt functions constitutes gross income from the
conduct of unrelated trade or business.213
Thus, the more popular the branded merchandise becomes, the more
the sales of the branded merchandise will increase and the more likely the
charity will become subject to this type of attack. However, one could ar-
gue that the increased sales should be viewed as proportionally increasing
207. Id. at 1190-91. The court determined that the sale of the $2 and $3 premiums was not a trade
or business activity because the markup on these items was so high that these sales did not compete
with sales by for-profit businesses. Id. at 1187. However, the sales of the $5 premiums were competi-
tively priced, and therefore constituted a trade or business activity, Id. A few years after DA V I was
decided, an exclusion from UBTI was added for the provision of "low-cost" items in connection with
the solicitation of charitable contributions. See I.R.C. § 513(h). Currently, an item can be valued at
$9.60 or less and be considered "low-cost." Rev. Proc. 2009-50, sec. 3.25(1), 2009-45 I.R.B. 471.
208. DA VI, 650 F.2d at 1189.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006).




the dissemination of charity's message by, among other things, allowing
persons to view, consider, and spread the charity's message to others.
214
While existing guidance lends support to a claim by a charity that the
revenues received from the sale of branded merchandise are excluded from
the charity's UBTI, the preceding countervailing authority undercuts this
claim. The only guidance directly on point in this area is in the form of
private letter rulings, which may not be used as precedent by other taxpay-
ers and are not binding on the Internal Revenue Service for persons other
than the taxpayer to whom the private ruling is addressed. 215 Accordingly,
the Internal Revenue Service is free to reconsider the position it has taken
in these private rulings. Furthermore, the foregoing case law and the Treas-
ury Regulations contain some troubling precedent which may limit the
extent to which a charity may conduct sales of branded merchandise and
still claim exclusion of the revenues from UBTI. Therefore, charities en-
gaged in direct sales of branded merchandise do not have as much certainty
as they would like in their position that the revenues from the sale of
branded merchandise are excluded from UBTI.
2. Sales of Branded Merchandise and Promotional Merchandise
Conducted by the Corporate Partner
For sales of branded merchandise directly by the corporate partner and
sales of promotional merchandise conducted by the corporate partner, dif-
ferent considerations apply in determining whether the income received by
the charity from the arrangement is excluded from the charity's UBTI. As
mentioned previously, most cause-related marketing alliances involve rec-
ognition of the corporate partner's participation by the charity on its web-
site and in print materials. Thus, this section first analyzes the possible
application of the corporate sponsorship rules to cause-related marketing
alliances. Cause-related marketing alliances also involve payment for the
use of the charity's name, logo, or trademark; accordingly, this section next
analyzes the application of the royalty exception to cause-related marketing
alliances. Finally, because consumer perception of product endorsement by
the charity might be considered as a factor in the UBTI analysis, this sec-
tion analyzes whether the income received from cause-related marketing
alliances could be included in UBTI as advertising income.
214. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-50-003 (Sept. 18, 1995) (reasoning that a museum's sales
through retail stores appropriately advanced the museum's exempt purposes by (i) making period-
pieces available to a broader segment of the public; (ii) enhancing the public's understanding of that
period; and (iii) encouraging a broader segment of the public to visit the museum).
215. See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).
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a. Corporate sponsorship rules do not (fully) address the issue.
The corporate sponsorship rules were enacted to address the situation
where the charity uses the corporate sponsor's logo on the charity's materi-
als. Cause-related marketing alliances typically involve the use of the char-
ity's name or logo on the corporate partner's products. At first blush, the
corporate sponsorship exception seemingly would not apply to cause-
related marketing. However, cause-related marketing alliances often in-
volve the charity's recognition of the alliance by acknowledging the corpo-
rate partner on the charity's website or print materials. Therefore, a charity
may claim that at least a portion of the payment received is a "sponsorship
payment" and attempt to treat that portion separately from the other reve-
nue received from the cause-related marketing alliance. In particular, this
may be the case where the alliance guarantees the charity a minimum "con-
tribution" from the corporate partner from the sale of the promotional mer-
chandise.
In order for a sponsorship payment received by a charity to be ex-
cluded from the charity's UBTI as a qualified sponsorship payment, the
affiliation cannot provide a substantial return benefit to the corporate part-
ner.216 A "substantial return benefit" is any benefit other than a "use or
acknowledgement" of the corporate sponsor.217 Importantly, substantial
benefits include any license to use intangible assets of the charitable or-
ganization.218 Since cause-related marketing alliances grant the corporate
partner a license to use the charity's name and logo on the product, such a
right would be a substantial return benefit. Nonetheless, the portion, if any,
of the payment that exceeds the fair market value of the license to use the
charity's name or logo may still be a qualified sponsorship payment.219
In order for the sponsorship payment to be a qualified sponsorship
payment, the charity may not make an impermissible use or acknowledge-
ment of the corporate sponsor. The permitted "uses or acknowledgements"
include (i) "logos and slogans that do not contain qualitative or compara-
tive descriptions of the [sponsor's] products, services, facilities or com-
pany," (ii) "a list of the [sponsor's] locations, telephone numbers, or
Internet address," (iii) "value-neutral descriptions, including displays or
visual depictions, of the [sponsor's] product-line or services," and (v) "the
[sponsor's] brand or trade names and product or service listings." 220 "Lo-
216. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1) (2002).
217. Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2).
218. Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii).
219. Id. § 1.513-4(d).
220. Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv).
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gos or slogans that are an established part of [the sponsor's] identity are not
considered to contain qualitative or comparative descriptions.
'221
In conjunction with the corporate partner's use of the charity's name
or logo, the charity may acknowledge the affiliation on the charity's web-
site or printed materials. Depending on how the charity describes its affilia-
tion with the corporate partner, the "use or acknowledgement" exception
may not apply. The display of the logos and/or slogans of the corporate
partners are "uses or acknowledgements." The provision of hyperlinks to
various sponsors' Internet sites also constitutes merely "uses or acknowl-
edgements," provided the sponsor's Internet site does not contain addi-
tional statements indicating that the charity promotes the sponsor or its
products or services. 222 However, the provision of the hyperlink to the
sponsor's website by the charity may be for the purpose of encouraging
consumers to purchase the branded merchandise or promotional merchan-
dise from the sponsor because the proceeds from those sales benefit the
charity. Since the corporate sponsorship rules were not designed with
cause-related marketing activities in mind, they do not address whether the
charity's motivation in providing the link to the partner's website should be
taken into account in determining whether the charity is promoting the
sponsor's products or services.
In addition, the branded merchandise may contain the corporate spon-
sor's name or logo, potentially causing confusion as to which entity's
product is being sold. For example, the LIVESTRONG brand of merchan-
dise, sold through the Lance Armstrong Foundation website, the Nike
LIVESTRONG web store, and in Nike physical stores, prominently dis-
plays the Nike "swoosh" symbol in yellow. Similarly, merchandise in the
(PRODUCT)Red campaign carries both the trademark (PRODUCT)Red logo
and the sponsoring company's name or logo. In these types of cases, the
corporate partner could be viewed as receiving the benefit of the inclusion
of the corporate partner's logo on the branded merchandise belonging to
the charity for free. Thus, the question arises as to whether the inclusion of
the corporate partner's logo on the branded merchandise is a mere use or
acknowledgement.
The application of the "use or acknowledgement" exception to the
inclusion of the corporate partner's logo on the branded merchandise is not
221. Id.
222. Id. § 1.513-4(f), examples 11 & 12; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-03-062 (Oct. 22, 2002). For an
interesting discussion of the effects of Cyberspace on the distinction between a charity's mere use or
acknowledgement of a corporate sponsor and advertising, see generally Daryll K. Jones, Advertisements
and Sponsorships in Charitable Cyberspace: Virtual Reality Meets Legal Fiction, 70 MiSS. L.J. 323
(2000).
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as clear. The existence of the use or acknowledgment exception reflects the
conclusion that mere inclusion of a corporate partner's name or logo on a
charity's product is not an implied endorsement of the corporate partner's
products or services by the charity. One way to view the inclusion of the
corporate partner's logo on the branded merchandise is as an insubstantial
benefit to the corporate partner in return for the corporate partner's contri-
bution of a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the branded merchan-
dise to the charity. If so considered, including the corporate partner's logo
on the branded merchandise could be considered a mere use or acknowl-
edgement of the corporate partner's sponsorship, and not an endorsement
of the corporate partner's product.
223
However, what if the arrangement is not viewed as the inclusion of the
corporate partner's logo on the charity's product, but instead is viewed as
the inclusion of the charity's name or logo on the corporate partner's prod-
uct? The corporate partner's interest in using the charity's name or logo on
the corporate partner's product is the desire to portray to consumers a close
association with the charity. The association with the charity is expected to
improve the corporate partner's image and goodwill among consumers,
thus potentially resulting in increased sales for the corporate partner. Thus,
an argument could be made that a charity allowing its name or logo to be
used on the corporate partner's product is in effect endorsing or advertising
the corporate partner's product.
"Advertising" is "any message or other programming material which
is broadcast or otherwise transmitted, published, displayed or distributed,
and which promotes or markets any trade or business, or any service, facil-
ity or product. '224 Advertising includes "messages containing qualitative or
comparative language, price information or other indications of savings or
value, an endorsement, or an inducement to purchase, sell, or use any com-
pany, service, facility or product. '225 For example, the Internal Revenue
223. However, if the charity's website or printed materials contain qualitative or comparative
descriptions of the sponsor's product or other endorsements of the sponsor's product, the charity's
website or printed material would be considered an advertisement, and thus revenues from the cause-
related marketing alliance would be UBTI. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
224. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(v) (2002).
225. Id. Typically, advertising is considered to be a trade or business that is unrelated to the char-
ity's exempt purposes. Thus, the question remains whether the advertising activity is "regularly carried
on." If advertising messages of a corporate sponsor's product are continuously present on the charity's
website, such advertising activities would seem to be regularly carried on and the revenues therefrom
would thus constitute UBTI. One counter-argument would appear to be that the limited number of
advertisements makes the charity's activities dissimilar in extent to comparable commercial activities.
See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-17-003 (Dec. 31, 1993) (stating that an advertising campaign conducted
by placing advertisements in programs for an organization's annual ball was not typical of commercial
endeavors because solicitations for advertisements were limited in number and consisted of a single
form letter). Given the variety and relative novelty of Interet advertisements, it would be unwise for a
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Service considers the following messages to consist, at least in part, of
advertising: (i) "This program has been brought to you by the Music Shop,
located at 123 Main Street. For your music needs, give them a call at 555-
1234. This station is proud to have the Music Shop as a sponsor, ''226 and
(ii) "Visit the Music Shop today for the finest selection of music CDs and
cassette tapes. '227 If a single message contains both advertising and an
acknowledgement, the message is an advertisement. Where the Treasury
Regulations do not allow one to clearly distinguish between advertisements
and permitted uses and acknowledgements, a court may be inclined to take
a common-sense approach and consider a message an advertisement if it
"looks like" an ad.228 If the inclusion of the corporate logo on the branded
merchandise is considered to be advertising rather than a mere use or ac-
knowledgement, then the income the charity receives from the affiliation is
likely subject to tax as UBTI, as more fully discussed below.
b. Use of the charity's name or logo may not fit within the royalty
exception.
Based on the success of taxpayers in establishing royalty treatment for
payments for the use of the charity's name and logo in the affinity card
context, it would seem that the payments received by a charity for the li-
censing of their name, logo, and trademarks in connection with the sale of
the branded merchandise and promotional merchandise should also be con-
sidered royalties and thus exempt from the charity's UBTI. This result pre-
supposes that the charity is not performing more than an insubstantial
amount of services in connection with the licensing of the charity's name,
logo, and trademarks. If the charity performs more than insubstantial ser-
vices, then the income received is considered compensation for personal
services, the royalty exception would not apply, and the income would
most likely be subject to tax as UBTI.
The determination of the permissible amount of "insubstantial ser-
charity to rely upon such a position. See generally I.R.S. Announcement 2000-84, 2000-42 I.R.B. 385
(announcing that the Internal Revenue Service was considering whether clarification was needed as to
the application of the "regularly carried on" requirement to business activities conducted on the Inter-
net).
226. Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 7.
227. Id. at example 8. Where a document can be broken down into segments identified in the
Treasury Regulations, a court or the Internal Revenue Service will likely analyze each segment with
reference to the rules set out above. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-05-001 (Oct. 7, 1997) (con-
cluding that an "ad" did not rise to the level of advertising when it consisted of a can of a sponsor's pet
food made to look like a trophy and included two slogans that had long been used by the sponsor in its
advertising).
228. See, e.g., State Police Ass'n of Mass. v. Comn'r, 125 F.3d 1, 6 (lst Cir. 1997).
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vices" is uncertain, however, especially in connection with the charitable
organization's exercise of quality control over the use of its name, logo,
and trademarks. As is prudent business practice, a charity would want to
maintain quality control over the use of its name, logo, and trademark by
the corporate partner under the licensing agreement. In some cases, the
Internal Revenue Service has determined that "mere" quality control does
not constitute more than insubstantial services related to the royalty in-
come. 229 In other cases, a charity's "quality control" was recharacterized as
services, resulting in the income from the arrangement being taxed as com-
pensation from services rather than exempted as royalty income. 230 There-
fore, charities are left to struggle with the determination of the permissible
types of "quality control" they can include in their licensing agreements
without crossing the boundary between de minimus and substantial ser-
vices.
Furthermore, caution should be taken in relying on the royalty excep-
tion for income received from the licensing of a charity's name or logo for
placement on a corporate partner's product. Recently, in evaluating the
justification for the continued tax exemption for college athletic programs,
the Congressional Budget Office recommended repealing the royalty ex-
ception to the extent that it applies to the licensing of a charity's name or
logo:
Some types of royalty income may reasonably be considered more
commercial than others.... [W]hen colleges and universities license
team names, mottoes, and other trademarks to for-profit businesses that
supply apparel, accessories, and credit cards to the general public, they
approve each product and use of their symbols and, in some cases, ex-
change information, such as donor lists, with the licensees to aid in their
marketing.... The manufacture or sale of such items would clearly be
commercial-and subject to the UBIT-if undertaken directly by the
schools. Schools' active involvement in generating licensing income
229. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-01-033 (Oct. 14,
2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-29-047 (Apr. 27, 1990). In Private Letter Ruling 2006-01-033, the
charity retained the right to review the commercial counterpart's designs and proposed uses of the
charity's intellectual property, inspect the commercial counterpart's facilities where the product was
manufactured, and inspect the commercial counterpart's books and records annually. The Internal
Revenue Service determined that these services performed by the charity in connection with the licens-
ing arrangement were de minimus. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-01-033. Moreover, the Internal Revenue
Service concluded the licensing agreement was narrowly tailored to protect the charity's ownership of
its intellectual property by giving the charity absolute discretion to reject proposed uses of the property,
providing notice on every unit displaying the charity's mark that it was used with the charity's permis-
sion, and allowing the charity to approve and limit mass media advertising of the product. Id.
230. See, e.g., NCAA v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 456, 468-70 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 914 F.2d
1417 (10th Cir. 1990); Fraternal Order of Police v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 747, 758 (1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d
717 (7th Cir. 1987).
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could be the basis for considering such income as commercial and there-
fore subject to the UBTI....
Bringing royalty income that accrues only to athletic departments
under the UBIT would be problematic, however .... [I]f royalty income
from licensing team names to for-profit businesses was truly considered
commercial and subject to the UBIT, the same arguments would apply in
full force to licensing all other university names and trademarks. A con-
sistent policy would subject all such income to the UBIT because of its
commercial nature. Such a change in policy could affect many other
nonprofits in addition to colleges and universities .... 23 1
Even if the royalty exception is not repealed as proposed by the Con-
gressional Budget Office, the law is not clear that the use of the charity's
name or logo on the corporate partner's products fits within the royalty
exception. If the charity's name or logo is placed on the corporate partner's
product (as is the case in promotional merchandising) or is viewed as being
placed on the corporate partner's product (as described above for branded
merchandise), the payment could instead be viewed as received in connec-
tion with the joint advertisement of the product.232 Especially relevant in
this analysis is consumer perception of apparent endorsement of the prod-
uct by the charity because the charity has allowed its name and logo to be
placed on the product without qualification. Although the licensing agree-
ment and official position of the charity may state that the charity does not
endorse the product, the charity normally retains the right to approve how
its name and logo are used on the product. By approving the placement of
its name and logo on the product, the charity should be held to the reason-
able impressions such cause-related marketing leaves in the minds of con-
sumers. If the charity's name and logo are used in such a way as to give
consumers the impression that the charity endorses the product, the charity
231. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 3005, TAx PREFERENCES FOR COLLEGIATE SPORTS 13
(2009). Previous proposals to modify the royalty exception include repealing the exemption for royal-
ties from the use of property where the charity "either created the property or performed substantial
services or incurred substantial costs" in developing or marketing the property. See Pat Jones, Oversight
Subcommittee Makes More Progress on UBIT Package, 39 TAx NOTES 1022, 1023 (1988); Pat Jones,
Pickle Subcommittee Appears Willing to Modify UBIT Stance, 39 TAX NOTES 907, 907 (1988). Such
proposals would have worked to treat royalty income from the use of a charity's patents or copyrights
as UBTI. Pat Jones, House Oversight Subcommittee UBIT Proposals Stir Cautious Reactions, 39 TAX
NOTES 153, 155 (1988).
232. Whether the placement of a charity's name or logo on a corporate partner's product is a joint
advertisement is a fact specific determination. In some cases, the association between the charity's
mission and the corporate partner's product is such that it would be clear the charity is not impliedly
endorsing the corporate partner's product. In other cases, the charity's mission and the corporate part-
ner's product are so closely aligned that it is unclear whether the charity endorses the corporate part-
ner's product. See infra notes 291-300 and accompanying text. The issue is prevalent because the most
successful cause-related marketing alliances occur when the charity's mission and corporate partner's
products are closely aligned.
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should be deemed to have endorsed the product. If the Internal Revenue
Service looks beyond the explicit terms of the agreement to the manner in
which the agreement is carried out, the payment may be considered adver-
tising income received by the charity and may no longer be excluded from
the charity's UBTI.
c. Is revenue from cause-related marketing advertising revenue?
If the combined use of the charity's logo and the corporate partner's
logo on branded merchandise or the use of the charity's logo on promo-
tional merchandise is considered advertising, the next question is whether
such advertising constitutes a regularly carried on trade or business that is
not substantially related to the charity's exempt purpose. Advertising ac-
tivities are routinely considered to constitute a trade or business. 233 Chari-
ties in litigation involving advertising typically concede this point.234
Since the sponsor's logo is continuously present on branded merchan-
dise, advertising activities involving such merchandise would likely be
considered to be "regularly carried on," especially where the merchandise
is sold on a year-round basis. For promotional products, the question of
whether the inclusion of the charity's logo on the sponsor's product is ad-
vertising that is regularly carried on may turn on the length of time of the
promotion. For isolated promotions that are conducted on a short-term
basis, the advertising may not be "regularly carried on" by the charity.235 In
233. See United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 839 (1986) ("Congress has de-
clared unambiguously that the publication of paid advertising is a trade or business activity .... "); State
Police Ass'n of Mass. v. Comm'r, 125 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that an organization's sale of
advertising in an annual "yearbook" constituted a trade or business because (i) the yearbook included
"display ads (using logos, slogans, and blocking), a directory section, and a message asking readers to
patronize the businesses listed therein," (ii) the price of the ad was proportional to its size, and (iii) the
organization characterized the disputed activity as advertising); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-28-059 (Apr.
17, 2001) ("[T]he solicitation, selling, and publishing of advertising in connection with [an] annual golf
tournament is an unrelated trade or business .... ).
234. See, e.g., NCAA v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 2003-
03-062 (Oct. 22, 2002) (conceding that displaying banner advertisements on an organization's internet
site constituted an unrelated trade or business).
235. Several authorities discuss intermittent sales of advertising; their conclusions often turn upon
whether preparatory activities are included in determining the duration of such activities. Although the
Internal Revenue Service is more likely than the courts to include the length of preparatory activities in
its determinations, the weight of authority holds that preparatory activities do not constitute part of a
business activity if the preparatory activities are related to an isolated event, such as an entertainment or
sporting event, but that preparatory activities are included in other circumstances. Compare Suffolk
County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1314 (1981) (determining that advertising
sold in a program guide for performances occurring on a single weekend was not "regularly carried on,"
even though preparation for the performances. including the solicitation of advertising, lasted for eight
to sixteen weeks each year; also rejecting the notion that hiring professionals to ensure the success of a
fundraiser impacts the analysis of whether an activity is regularly carried on), acq., 1984-2 C.B. 2, and
NCAA, 914 F.2d 1417 (concluding that the sale of advertising in the program for the Final Four round
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contrast, if the chaity conducts promotions that allow the use of the char-
ity's name or logo on commercial products with many corporate partners
throughout the year, the likelihood increases that a court or the Internal
Revenue Service would consider all of the charity's promotional activities
to be regularly carried on.
Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service generally consider
the publication and distribution of advertising by a charity to be unrelated
to the accomplishment of the charity's exempt purposes. For example, the
Treasury Regulations provide that even if an exempt organization formed
to advance the interests of a particular profession advertises only products
"within the general area of professional interest of its members," the adver-
tisements do not bear a substantial relation to the organization's exempt
function when "the informational function of the advertising is incidental to
the controlling aim of stimulating demand for the advertised products and
differs in no essential respect from the informational function of any com-
mercial advertising. ' 236 Even though one of the purposes of such an ex-
empt organization is to educate its members in matters pertaining to their
profession, the Treasury Regulations do not consider "the publication of
advertising designed and selected in the manner of ordinary commercial
of the NCAA college basketball tournament was not regularly carried on because (i) the programs were
distributed for less than three weeks (even though solicitation and preparation activities took place over
a longer period of time), and (ii) the publication of advertising is normally a year-round activity), action
on dec., 1991-015 (July 3, 1991), with State Police Ass'n of Mass. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 582
(1996) (concluding that the sale of advertising in an annual yearbook was a regularly carried on activity
when such advertising was solicited by professional fundraisers working approximately forty-six weeks
per year, and distinguishing the foregoing cases on the basis that the publication of this yearbook was
not tied to a particular event), afid, 125 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
application of fragmentation in American College of Physicians, the reasoning behind the exclusion of
preparatory activities in advertising sales in these cases seems questionable. See Am. Coll. of Physi-
cians, 475 U.S. 834.
As alluded to above, the Internal Revenue Service typically takes the contrary position that
preparatory activities constitute part of the business activity for purposes of the regularly carried on
requirement. In Revenue Ruling 73-424, for example, the Internal Revenue Service concluded that the
annual sale of a yearbook was regularly carried on, where (i) intensive solicitation of advertising space
lasted only three months out of the year, (ii) distribution lasted a shorter period, (iii) distribution of the
yearbook did not tie into any other organizational activity, (iv) the preparation of the yearbook was
carried out as a regular staff duty from year to year, and (v) "no part of the advertising program for
which the independent firm had assumed responsibility varie[d] from customary commercial practice in
any material respect." Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190. Similarly, in Private Letter Ruling 2001-28-
059, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that income from advertising related to an annual golf tourna-
ment constituted UBTI when the entity solicited advertising during a nine-month period before the
tournament. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-28-059 (Apr. 17, 2001). In contrast, in Revenue Ruling 75-201,
the Internal Revenue Service concluded that the sale of advertising space in an annual concert book was
not regularly carried on, where (i) the book was distributed at the orchestra's annual charity ball, (ii) a
volunteer committee designed each book and solicited advertising for it, and (iii) solicitation activities
never continued for "an extended period" of time. Rev. Rul. 75-201, 1975-1 C.B. 164.
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(iv), example 7 (as amended in 1983).
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advertising" to be an "educational activity. '237
The United States Supreme Court considered whether advertising
could be substantially related to an organization's exempt purposes in
United States v. American College of Physicians,238 the leading case on this
topic. There, an exempt physicians' organization received income from the
sale of advertising in its professional journal.239 The messages in question
consisted of advertisements for "pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and
equipment useful in the practice of internal medicine. '240 The organization
"has a long-standing practice of accepting only advertisements containing
information about the use of medical products, and screens proffered adver-
tisements for accuracy and relevance to internal medicine."' 241 The organi-
zation argued that these advertisements were substantially related to its
exempt functions because they contributed to the education of the journal's
readers. 242 At trial, experts testified that "drug advertising performs a valu-
able function for doctors by disseminating information on recent develop-
ments in drug manufacture and use."'24 3 Rejecting the organization's claim
and ruling that the advertising income was UBTI, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed this issue as follows:
[A]ll advertisements contain some information, and if a modicum of in-
formative content were enough to supply the important contribution nec-
essary to achieve tax exemption for commercial advertising, it would be
the rare advertisement indeed that would fail to meet the test. Yet the
statutory and regulatory scheme, even if not creating a per se rule
against tax exemption, is clearly antagonistic to the concept of a per se
rule for exemption .... Thus, the Claims Court properly directed its at-
tention to the College's conduct of its advertising business, and it found
the following pertinent facts:
The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not use the advertising to
provide its readers a comprehensive or systematic presentation of
any aspect of the goods or services publicized. Those companies
willing to pay for advertising space got it; others did not. Moreover,
some of the advertising was for established drugs or devices and
was repeated from one month to another, undermining the sugges-
tion that the advertising was principally designed to alert readers of
237. Id.
238. 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
239. Id. at 836.
240. Id.
241. Id.




recent developments .... Some ads even concerned matters that
had no conceivable relationship to the College's tax-exempt pur-
poses.
... This is not to say that the College could not control its publi-
cation of advertisements in such a way as to reflect an intention to con-
tribute importantly to its educational functions. By coordinating the
content of the advertisements with the editorial content of the issue, or
by publishing only advertisements reflecting new developments in the
pharmaceutical market, for example, perhaps the College could satisfy
the stringent standards erected by Congress and the Treasury.
244
Generally, displaying the charity's name or logo on the advertisement
likely would not be sufficient to cause the advertising to be substantially
related to the charity's exempt purposes. Although there are no rulings or
other primary authorities considering receipts from advertisements bearing
an exempt organization's name or logo, the Internal Revenue Service has
considered receipts from the direct sale of items bearing an exempt organi-
zation's name or logo. 245 If the inclusion of the charity's name or logo on
items directly sold by the charity would not prevent receipts from constitut-
ing UBTI, then afortiori, there is little reason to suppose that receipts from
advertisements of a third party's products or services which contain the
charity's name or logo would not constitute UBTI. However, as discussed
in detail above, the Internal Revenue Service has on occasion reached a
contrary conclusion regarding the sale of t-shirts and similar items bearing
an organization's name or symbol, where additional facts demonstrated
how the items furthered the organization's exempt function. If such addi-
tional facts are present-for example, if the items advertised displayed the
charity's message-this would be a positive factor. Note, though, that the
positive rulings would still not be directly applicable to receipts obtained
from a sponsor for advertising a product. One would need to closely exam-
ine all of the facts and circumstances to determine the extent to which the
advertising activity promoted the charity's message (as opposed to promot-
244. Id. at 848-50 (citation omitted). Several cases and rulings follow the reasoning of American
College of Physicians. See, e.g., Minn. Holstein-Frisian Breeders Ass'n v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH)
1319 (1992) (holding that advertisements that may have been of "incidental benefit to breeders in
running their day-to-day operations" but that did not "contribute importantly to improving the quality of
the breed of Holstein-Friesian cattle" were not substantially related to a cattle breeding organization's
exempt purposes); Fla. Trucking Ass'n v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1039 (1986) (holding that advertisements of
products of particular interest to the trucking industry did not bear a substantial relationship to the
exempt functions of a trucking trade association); Rev. Rul. 82-139, 1982-2 C.B. 108 (concluding that a
bar association's publication of advertisements for products and services used by the legal profession
was not substantially related to the association's exempt purposes).
245. See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
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ing the corporate partner more generally), with unpredictable results.
3. UBTI Rules Need to Address Unique Nature of Cause-Related
Marketing
The analysis of the application of existing UBTI guidance to cause-
related marketing activities reveals that there are many unanswered ques-
tions in this area, and the results can be uncertain and unpredictable.
246
Given the prevalence of cause-related marketing and the implications for
smaller charities attempting to imitate the success of large charities' cause-
related marketing alliances, the Internal Revenue Service should issue
guidance on the UBTI treatment of cause-related marketing by charities. A
revenue ruling or Treasury regulation setting forth safe harbor provisions
for permitted cause-related marketing alliances would be mutually benefi-
cial because it would reduce the administrative burden on the Internal
Revenue Service of examining these arrangements on a case by case basis,
and it would allow charities to more easily comply with the law. In particu-
lar, smaller charities that cannot readily afford legal counsel to assist them
in structuring complex licensing transactions would benefit.
Cause-related marketing alliances today are significantly different that
the affinity card programs litigated in Sierra Club and its progeny. Contin-
ued reliance on the royalty exception as described in Revenue Ruling 81-
178 and the affinity card cases for the UBTI treatment of royalties from the
use of a charity's name, logo, or trademark in cause-related marketing alli-
ances is misguided. First, Revenue Ruling 81-178 is directed not at a chari-
table organization, but at a tax-exempt labor organization. 247 While both
types of organizations are subject to the same UBTI rules, charitable or-
ganizations are subject to much more scrutiny in maintaining their tax ex-
emption. This is because charitable organizations are required to operate
for public benefit; labor organizations are not. Charities receive additional
tax subsidies in the form of deductible charitable contributions; labor or-
ganizations do not.
246. A review of the Form 990s filed by several of the charities that engage in the cause-related
marketing alliances described in this article reveals that these charities universally treat the income
received from the corporate partners in their cause-related marketing alliances as exempt income, but on
different claims. See, e.g., American Heart Association, Inc. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2009, at p. 9 (available at www.guidestar.org)
(reporting as exempt royalties); Lance Armstrong Foundation Merchandise Form 990, Return of Or-
ganization Exempt from Income Tax, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, at p. 9 (available at
www.guidestar.org) (reporting as exempt "licensing fees"); Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation,
Inc. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, for the fiscal year ended March 3 1,
20098, at p. 8 (available at www.guidestar.org) (reporting as exempt "affiliate payments").
247. SeeRev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135.
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Additionally, charitable organizations may not advocate for political office
candidates, may not engage in certain lobbying activities, may not confer
any private inurement, and may not confer more than insubstantial private
benefit. These restrictions generally do not apply to most other tax-exempt
organizations which are subject to the UBTI rules. Essentially, charities are
a special subset of tax-exempt organizations warranting different consid-
erations.
Second, the affinity card cases applying the royalty exception con-
tained in Revenue Ruling 81-178 to charitable organizations do not factor
in the unique nature of charitable organizations. Accordingly, several
commentators have argued that Sierra Club and its progeny are wrongly
decided. 248 In particular, the courts did not address what impact, if any,
private benefit concerns should play in determining whether licensing of a
charity's brand to sell commercial products is a passive royalty arrange-
ment. Furthermore, the courts did not consider the argument that the ar-
rangement be viewed as the charity's apparent endorsement of the affinity
card by virtue of the charity's name and logo placement on the card; there-
fore, the argument that the revenue be treated as advertising income was
not addressed. While consumer perception of apparent endorsement of the
product likely was not evident in the affinity card context, those percep-
tions can be prevalent in the context of cause-related marketing alliances.
Guidance is sorely needed to set forth a safe harbor under which chari-
ties could operate to claim the revenue received from cause-related market-
ing alliances is exempt from the charity's UBTI. This safe harbor should
take into account the unique aspects of cause-related marketing alliances
identified above. Failure to meet the safe harbor should not result in auto-
matic treatment of the revenue as UBTI; rather, the arrangement should
then be evaluated under the general UBTI principles discussed above, on a
case by case basis, to determine whether the revenue should be subject to
tax as UBTI.249
III. PRIVATE BENEFIT
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that to qual-
ify for tax-exempt status, a charitable organization must operate exclu-
248. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Aspirin & the Ultimate Tax Shelter, 64 TAX NOTES 420 (1994).
249. This treatment would be consistent with the way corporate sponsorship arrangements that fail
to meet the safe harbor of "qualified sponsorship payments" are treated.
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sively for charitable purposes.250 As part of this operational test, a charita-
ble organization may not confer more than incidental private benefit in
conducting its activities. The purpose of the private benefit limitation is to
ensure that charitable organizations are operated for public purposes be-
cause of their special tax status.251 Private benefit results when a benefit is
conferred upon an individual or entity who is not a member of the charita-
ble class intended to be benefited by the organization;252 it may or may not
include the diversion of charitable assets.253 If an organization provides
more than incidental private benefit, the organization's tax-exempt status
may be revoked.254 The determination of whether the private benefit is
more than incidental is based on a "'balancing test" set forth in a 1987 Gen-
eral Counsel Memorandum:
A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is incidental in both a
qualitative and a quantitative sense. In order to be incidental in a qualita-
tive sense, the benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the activity
which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity can be accomplished
only by benefiting certain private individuals. To be incidental in a quan-
titative sense, the private benefit must not be substantial after consider-
ing the overall public benefit conferred by the activity. 255
There is much confusion and debate about the scope of the private
benefit doctrine. In early rulings and cases, the view seemed to be that the
private benefit was a restatement of the common law requirement that a
charity serve a charitable class of beneficiaries. 256 As long as the charitable
class served by the charity was broad enough, any private benefits con-
ferred as a byproduct of the charity's exempt activities was deemed inci-
250. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
251. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1990). According to the Treasury
Regulations, an organization does not qualify for exemption
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus ... it is necessary for an organiza-
tion to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.
Id.
252. See Colombo, supra note 27, at 681 ("Even trying to summarize the private benefit doctrine is
hazardous, but from a variety of IRS rulings and litigated cases, one might conclude that private benefit
is a benefit (usually economic) that flows to some person or entity outside the charitable class as a result
of serving the charitable class.").
253. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2004-31-023 (July 13, 2004).
254. For example, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that an organization formed to promote
interest in classical music was not exempt because its only method of achieving its goal was to support
a commercial radio station that was in financial difficulty. Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154.
255. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987) (citations omitted).
256. John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2006).
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dental. 257 Beginning in the second half of the 1970s, the Internal Revenue
Service expanded its view of the private benefit doctrine and found imper-
missible private benefit when the benefits flowing to private individuals
were deemed too large, even if such benefits stemmed from the provision
of charitable services to the charitable class.258 Then, after unsuccessfully
challenging the exempt status of a theatre company that had formed a part-
nership with private investors for the production of a play as per se private
benefit,259 the Internal Revenue Service announced its balancing test.
260
The Internal Revenue Service's balancing test was adopted by the Tax
Court in American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner.
261
Despite the confusion surrounding the scope and application of the
private benefit doctrine, two examples addressing whether private inure-
ment (which is similar to private benefit)262 has occurred are instructive in
determining whether the private benefit argument would be applied to
cause-related marketing activities. General Counsel Memorandum 37,289
provides the first example; there, the Internal Revenue Service concluded
that a joint advertising campaign carried on between a nonprofit organiza-
tion and a for-profit organization was not indicative of private inure-
ment.263 Although the circumstances are somewhat unclear, it appears that
the for-profit organization conducted all of the advertising while the non-
profit organization paid a sales commission. The Internal Revenue Service
reasoned that (i) the for-profit entity was not capitalizing on the nonprofit's
goodwill (because the nonprofit had only recently been created) and (ii)
joint advertising set up a cost-efficient economy with quidpro quo benefits
to both entities. 264 The Internal Revenue Service distinguished Restland
Memorial Park v. United States-the second example case-in which a
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1069-71.
259. See Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir.
1982).
260. Colombo, supra note 256, at 1071-72.
261. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
262. Private inurement involves the use of a charity's income or assets by insiders. In contrast to
private benefit, any amount of private inurement could result in the revocation of a charity's tax-exempt
status. However, revocation of tax-exempt status is rarely used to address instances of private inure-
ment. In 1996, an intermediate sanction regime was added to impose excise taxes on certain private
inurement transactions to give the Internal Revenue Service another enforcement tool to remedy private
inurement transactions. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2006). The intermediate sanction regime does not apply to
private benefit transactions.
263. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,289 (Oct. 7, 1977). While the joint advertising campaign itself
did not yield private inurement, the General Counsel concluded that the non-profit organization had not
proven that it was entitled to tax-exempt status because the overall "intertwining relationship" between
the non-profit and for-profit organizations caused prohibited private inurement. Id.
264. Id.
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joint advertising campaign between a nonprofit cemetery company and a
for-profit entity did result in private inurement, because the nonprofit en-
tity's goodwill was used to benefit the for-profit entity.265 The purpose of
cause-related marketing is to leverage the goodwill of the charity in a joint
campaign that provides mutual benefits for the charity (increased dona-
tions) and the corporate partner (sale of the promotional or branded mer-
chandise), but this raises concerns about whether cause-related marketing
alliances produce impermissible private benefit for the corporate partner.
A. Impermissible Private Benefit to the For-Profit Partner
It is undisputed that a cause-related marketing alliance results in some
benefit to the corporate partner. Otherwise, the corporate partner would be
expected to act under purely altruistic motives, which is not the case.
266
Furthermore, the benefits flowing to the corporate partner from the cause-
related marketing alliance are private benefits because they are not benefits
that are normally provided by the charity in the conduct of its charitable
activities. The question thus remains whether such private benefits flowing
to the corporate partner from the cause-related marketing alliance are more
than incidental. Before addressing this question, I will expand on the types
of benefits the corporate partner may receive from a cause-related market-
ing alliance.
One author notes that cause-related marketing could result in the fol-
lowing benefits to the corporate partner:
(1) creation of goodwill with the community, (2) differentiation of the
corporate image and its brands from competitors, (3) greater customer
acceptance of price increases, (4) increase in employee and channel
member morale, (5) recruitment of new employees, (6) use as a shield
against public criticism in times of crisis, (7) winning over skeptical pub-
lic officials (an aid in lobbying), and (8) increased revenues and prof-
its. 267
265. Id.; Restland Mem'l Park v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
266. See Vicki Thomas, Cause-Related Marketing: Bringing Together Senior Organizations and
Businesses, 28 GENERATIONS 71, 72 (2004) ("Potential sponsors of cause-related marketing programs
look for opportunities that help promote a product or service. It is not about charity.... If there is no
opportunity to move a product or service, the marketer won't be motivated to make a financial com-
mitment to the cause.").
267. Dean, supra note 3, at 92. Specific product-related benefits of cause-related marketing include
"breaking through advertising clutter, low cost exposure, the ability to sway selective customers who




Importantly, several studies have shown that cause-related marketing
increases customer goodwill of the corporate partner 268 and helps to estab-
lish brand loyalty.269 In one study, the author explains how the association
between a brand and a social cause could positively affect consumer per-
ception of the brand:
In [cause-related marketing], the association between a brand and a so-
cial cause could lead to a similar affect transfer process: consumers'
general positive attitudes toward the nonprofit organization could be
transferred to the sponsoring brand. In addition, as the brand promises to
donate money to the social cause, consumers may perceive the brand to
be altruistic, which could result in more favorable brand evaluations.
Furthermore, for consumers who themselves are altruistic, perceived al-
truism of the brand can result in a sense of connectedness or social iden-
tification, which is the inference that the sponsoring brand or company
has certain desirable traits that resonate with one's sense of self. All
these mechanisms suggest that consumers will respond more favorably
to a company/brand engaging in [cause-related marketing] versus a simi-
lar one that does not engage in this philanthropic activity .... 270
This study concludes that an advertisement for a product containing a
cause-related marketing message elicits more favorable consumer re-
sponses than a similar advertisement without a cause-related marketing
message and that consumers generally have a more favorable attitude to-
wards companies employing cause-related marketing. 271 Furthermore, con-
sumers with high brand consciousness had a more favorable attitude toward
the product or brand advertised when there was a high level of brand/cause
268. See, e.g., Xiaoli Nan & Kwangjun Heo, Consumer Responses to Corporate Social Responsi-
bility (CSR) Initiatives: Examining the Role of Brand-Cause Fit in Cause-Related Marketing, J.
ADVERTISING, Summer 2005, at 63, 64 (noting that previous studies have found that consumer percep-
tion is largely favorable of corporations which engage in cause-related marketing); Dean, supra note 3,
at 101 (demonstrating that a single episode of cause-related marketing led consumers to increase their
favorable perception of corporations with a reputation for social irresponsibility and had little to no
effect on increased favorable customer perceptions of corporations with scrupulous reputations, but
concluding that all firms could realize an increase in customer goodwill by engaging in prolonged
cause-related marketing activities that demonstrate a long-term commitment to the cause).
269. See, e.g., Hassay & Peloza, supra note 2. In surveying previous studies, the authors explain:
Identification with a cause has even been shown to extend to the type of products that sup-
porters buy. For example, consumers have been shown to actively search for and purchase
products that support causes that they identify with. In addition, [one study] found that con-
sumers not only select products based on charity affiliation but that they will even pay more
for products affiliated with personally relevant charities.
Id. at 37-38 (citations omitted); see also Nan & Heo, supra note 268, at 64 (noting that previous studies
have found that a corporation's cause-related marketing activities positively influences consumer
willingness to purchase the corporation's product or services).
270. Nan & Heo, supra note 268, at 66 (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 70.
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fit in the cause-related marketing program. 2
72
Another study revealed that forty-five percent of consumers surveyed
said they would switch brands to buy from a company that supported a
charitable cause.273 Yet another study revealed that almost fifty percent of
consumers surveyed indicated they had purchased a product primarily be-
cause of their desire to support the charitable cause and that most consum-
ers were willing to try a new brand as a result of a cause-related
promotion.274
A survey conducted by Cone Communications in 2004 lends addi-
tional support to these conclusions. The 2004 study reported that eighty-six
percent of the 1,033 adults surveyed responded that they would "switch
from one brand to another that is about the same in price and quality, if the
other brand is associated with a cause. '275 Additionally, seventy four per-
cent of the respondents reported that a company's commitment to a social
issue would be important in determining which products and services they
would recommend to other people. 276
Anecdotal evidence also suggests the benefits received by the corpo-
rate partner from engaging in cause-related marketing activities are real-
and substantial. For example, in 1983 when American Express launched its
campaign to renovate the Statute of Liberty and Ellis Island, American
Express experienced a twenty-eight percent increase in credit card usage
over the preceding year.277 Affinity card programs generated a twenty per-
cent incremental sales growth for U.S. banks in the early 1990s, and for
MBNA, the bank with the largest base of affinity card customers, the affin-
ity card programs resulted in customer defections at half the industry
272. Id. at 70-71 ("It appears that the addition of a [cause-related marketing] component, whether it
involves high or low brand/cause fit, to a regular ad message is beneficial in that it enhances the spon-
soring company's overall image."); see also Grau & Folse, supra note 22 (concluding that customers
more involved in the cause were more likely to favorably perceive the cause-related marketing alliance
which supports that cause).
273. Emily DeNitto, Marketing with a Conscience, MARKETING COMM., May 1989, at 42,43.
274. John K. Ross, Mary Ann Stutts & Larry Patterson, Tactical Considerations for the Effective
Use of Cause-Related Marketing, 7 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 58, 61-62 (1991).
275. CONE, 2004 CONE CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP STUDY: BUILDING BRAND TRUST 2 (2004),
available at http://www.coneinc.con/research/archive.php (follow the "2004 Corporate Citizenship
Study" hyperlink); see also Michal Strahilevitz, supra note 53, at 231 (reaching the same conclusion as
the Cone study and further concluding that for certain types of products, consumers may be willing to
pay a higher price for a charity-linked product that offers a relatively larger contribution than a lower-
priced charity-linked product offering a smaller contribution).
276. CONE, supra note 275, at 2; cf. Andreasen, supra note 18, at 169-72 (summarizing numerous
studies that have reported (i) positive consumer attitudes towards companies that engage in cause-
related marketing, and (ii) increased consumer preferences for products from such companies).
277. Dean, supra note 3, at 92.
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rate. 278
A case study of the Sierra Club's alliance with Toyota to promote the
sale of Toyota's hybrid cars hypothesizes the monetary values of the first-
order and second-order benefits resulting from the partnership as follows:
1. Increased sales of Toyota hybrids resulting in $6 million more in
profits
2. A 10 percent reduction in employee turnover yielding training costs
reduced by $1 million
3. A saving of $3 million in Toyota's lobbying costs
4. 10,000 new donors joining the Sierra Club as a result of this part-
nership resulting in $2 million in new donations
5. 2,500 long-time supporters alienated by the alliance withholding $1
million in donations
6. Increases in consumers' awareness of environmental issues and the
need for more prudent automobile purchases and usage saves the Sierra
Club $1 million in advertising costs
The hypothetical net value of the alliance is therefore $12 million.
But what may be troubling is that 83 percent of this value is captured by
Toyota and only 17 percent by the Sierra Club. On the other hand, the
calculations do not include the cost of the venture. It is possible that
Toyota would bear 83 percent of the cost-but probably not.
279
Furthermore, companies view cause-related marketing alliances as
more business arrangement than philanthropic venture. 280 One study con-
cluded that companies are more concerned with cause-related marketing
motivations than philanthropic motivations, with enhancing company im-
age and promoting company products being the central motivations for
engaging in cause-related marketing alliances. 281 Nike appears to have
reaped the benefits of enhanced company image as a result of its cause-
related marketing alliance with the Lance Armstrong Foundation. While
the amount of these benefits has not been quantified, it has been reported
that the positive association with the LIVESTRONG message has boosted
Nike in subtle ways and helped to overcome a negative corporate image
developed in the 1990s after allegations of sweatshop conditions in its
278. Andreasen, supra note 18, at 171.
279. Id. at 183-184.
280. See Byrnes, supra note 74 ("Although companies are not handing out much more on the
whole-last year's giving equaled 1.2% of total corporate profits, the average over the past 40 years...
-they are taking a more businesslike approach to charity. The goal: to get the most out of every philan-
thropic dollar by tracking giving, measuring its impact, and helping nonprofits work more efficiently.").
281. File & Prince, supra note 3, at 1535.
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overseas factories; other social responsibility commitment programs under-
taken by Nike did not undercut this negative image. 282
An evaluation of whether the private benefits received by the corpo-
rate partner are more than incidental is difficult at best. To be incidental,
the benefit must be both quantitatively and qualitatively incidental. 283 A
benefit is quantitatively incidental if, after considering the overall public
benefit conferred by the activity, the private benefit is not substantial.
284
This requires a comparison of the value of the private benefit to the value
of the public benefit of the cause related-marketing alliance. Neither valua-
tion is easy. Some of the private benefits to the corporate partner may be
quantifiable, such as increased sales or revenues, but the value of many of
the benefits, such as enhanced corporate goodwill, improved employee
morale, and increase in customer esteem, may be difficult to value.
In determining the value of the public benefit, the first question is:
what is the public benefit? While raising funds is vital to the existence of
every charity, it is not the reason charities are granted a tax exemption.
285
The private benefit doctrine is typically applied to evaluate benefits stem-
ming from the conduct of the organization's core charitable activities. One
may argue that the amount paid to a charity as a result of a cause-related
marketing alliance that enables the charity to carry out its core charitable
activities is the public benefit resulting from the cause-related marketing
alliance. If this view is adopted, then a comparison of the value of the pri-
vate benefit flowing to the corporate partner to the money and other bene-
fits received by the charity should be made to determine if the corporate
282. Yellow Fever in the U.S. Gives Nike a Boost, supra note 40. ("' Something like this creates
goodwill. It creates a favorable impression and feeling toward the brand."' (quoting Nike spokesman
Scott Reames)). Unlike the other LIVESTRONG merchandise, the yellow LIVESTRONG bracelets do
not display the Nike "swoosh" symbol. Id. "Most consumers don't realize that the bracelet is part-and-
parcel of the sneaker giant's branding mechanism-and that's exactly why the concept has been so
successful .... " Id. "'By not putting a logo on it, they are avoiding the impression of commercial-
ism .... Once the media picks up on it, suddenly Nike comes off as the good guy without ever having
told you "Hey, look at what we're doing."' Id. (quoting retired president of the American Academy of
Advertising, Joseph Pisani). "'What the success of the yellow bracelet teaches us is that subtlety is the
best policy-rather than coming out and saying "We're doing all these great things."' Id. (quoting Paul
Swangard, managing director of the Warsaw Sports Marketing Center at the University of Oregon).
"Although the bracelet may be swooshless, some people will eventually make the link-and while that
might not sell shoes right away, the positive association will seep into the brand." Id. These predictions
seem to hold true. Currently, products in the LIVESTRONG collection offered by Nike bear the Nike
swoosh symbol. On some items, the only indication that the product is part of the LIVESTRONG
collection is the yellow Nike swoosh symbol, and the words LIVESTRONG do not appear on the
product.
283. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
284. Id.
285. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983) (providing that production of income for
use in an organization's exempt activities is alone not enough to make the conduct of the activity sub-
stantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purposes).
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benefits are substantially more than the charity's take under the cause-
related marketing alliance. If they are, then impermissible private benefit
would exist. Another view may be that the public benefit is the use of the
charity's goodwill because, as an asset of the charity, it is committed for
public purposes. Under this view, as long as the payments received by the
charity approximates the value of the nonexclusive license to use the char-
ity's name and logo, the charity is not harmed; therefore, there is no im-
permissible private benefit. However, this view ignores the amount of
benefits flowing to the corporate partner, which is a necessary factor in the
balancing test. 286 Therefore, the former view is the more appropriate view
under which to evaluate whether the arrangement produces more than inci-
dental private benefit in the quantitative sense.
The benefit is incidental in the qualitative sense if it is "a necessary
concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large. '287 In other
words, the activity only can be accomplished by benefiting the private
party.288 Cause-related marketing alliances are viewed by the charity as a
means of fundraising. The application of this test to fundraising activities is
difficult as the test was designed to be applied to the carrying out of the
organization's charitable activities. To be sure, fundraising is a necessary
activity of most charities. A literal application of this test would appear to
prohibit any private benefit from fundraising activities as long as it is pos-
sible to raise funds without conferring any benefit on the donors (i.e., by
raising funds only from purely gratuitous donations). Yet, in many fund-
raising campaigns donors receive some benefit in return, whether it be rec-
ognition of their generosity or a trinket item that donors can use or display
to show their support.
The end result of the private benefit analysis is to compare the value
of the benefits flowing to the corporate partner against the value of the
benefits flowing to the charity from the cause-related marketing alliance. In
addition to the monetary benefits received from the cause-related marketing
alliance, the charity benefits in the form of increased awareness of the char-
ity's message and name recognition because the charity gains publicity
from the corporate partner's marketing efforts to promote the alliance. The
actual benefit of increased publicity of the charity resulting from a cause-
related marketing alliance is hard to quantify, and necessitates a fact spe-
cific inquiry that may vary widely from one charity to the next. For exam-
ple, it may be that a local unfamiliar charity can benefit greatly from the
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publicity achieved in a cause-related marketing alliance with a well-known
corporate partner. Such an alliance could result in the charity becoming a
household name, possibly resulting is additional individual donations to the
charity. In contrast, a well-established charity may not gain as much addi-
tional public goodwill from a cause-related marketing alliance with a well-
known corporate partner. Since the charity's name and message are al-
ready well-known, increased publicity of the charity's name or message by
the corporate partner may not provide much additional benefit to the char-
ity. In this scenario, rather, the corporate partner may benefit more by lev-
eraging the existing public goodwill of the well-known charity to promote
increased public goodwill for the corporate partner.
When a comparison of the benefits to both the charity and the corpo-
rate partner produces a substantial discrepancy in favor of the corporate
partner, the cause-related marketing alliance would result in impermissible
private benefit. Yet, cause-related marketing activities on the whole are
generally not a significant part of the charity's activities. Therefore, revoca-
tion of the charity's tax-exempt status, the only remedy currently available
for violation of the private benefit doctrine, is harsh and likely unwar-
ranted. Rather, concerns about impermissible private benefit should be
factored into a safe harbor guidance that identifies specific cause-related
marketing activities which would not jeopardize a charity's tax-exempt
status.
B. Deceptive Information to the Consumer Enhances Private Benefit
Although cause-related marketing alliances may be a win-win situa-
tion for the charity and the corporate partner, the impact of cause-related
marketing alliances on an important third party, the consumer, needs to be
evaluated.289 The manner in which a cause-related marketing alliance is
conducted and communicated to consumers may have a significant impact
on consumers' willingness to purchase the product, and thus, participate in
the campaign. Collectively, these attributes may cause consumers to pur-
chase products that are part of the campaign over competing products, thus
enhancing the private benefit realized by the corporate partner.
Specifically, the prevalence of web-based platforms to promote cause-
related marketing alliances adds confusion to the amount of benefits the
charity receives from the campaign and possibly increases sales for the
289. See Pracejus, Olsen, & Brown, supra note 66, at 27. ("It is important to remember, however,
that [cause-related marketing] is not a dyadic exchange; it is a triadic one. In involves a third player: the
consumer.").
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corporate partner. For example, The Global Fund's website contains links
to websites of its corporate partners which sell (PRODUCT)Red merchan-
dise. A consumer who visits The Global Fund's website can click on the
link to The Gap's website to purchase a (PRODUCT)Red t-shirt. The con-
sumer is then redirected to The Gap's website where the consumer would
select the t-shirt and add it to his shopping cart. In this transaction, no dis-
closure is made to the consumer about being redirected to The Gap's web-
site. Because The Gap is a supporter of The Global Fund and the consumer
linked through to The Gap's web store from The Global Fund site, the con-
sumer may believe that a portion of the proceeds from any purchase made
in that transaction (whether they be (PRODUCT)Red merchandise or other
Gap products) will benefit The Global Fund. There is no disclosure to tell
them differently. Even if the consumer does not hold that belief, The Gap
could benefit in another way from the increased traffic to its web store. The
consumer could also want a new pair of jeans. Instead of going through the
hassle of another web transaction with a different merchant, or simply be-
cause the consumer now has a more positive image of The Gap generally
from its affiliation with The Global Fund, the consumer chooses to add
some jeans from The Gap's web store to his shopping cart at the time he
purchases the (PRODUCT)Red t-shirt. Studies support increased sales of
other products as a benefit to the corporate partner from cause-related mar-
keting alliances. 290 The prevalence of web-based platforms makes the re-
alization of this benefit that much easier.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the charity's name and logo on the
product may cause consumers to believe that the charity is endorsing the
particular product, possibly motivating consumers to purchase the prod-
uct.291 The consumer's perception of product endorsement by a charity can
become further blurred the more the attributes of the product relate to a
vital message of the charity. For example, the March of Dimes wanted to
promote a message to make pregnant women aware of their need for folic
acid, a B vitamin that can help prevent birth defects of the spine and
brain.292 At the same time, Kellogg was interested in increasing the sale of
290. See supra notes 269-276 and accompanying text.
291. See Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 7, at 10 ("The marketing arrangements, as typically set
up, are inescapably misleading to the buying public.... [T]he essential problem is the implied en-
dorsement from association with a charity, even when it is at pains to hold these relationships at arm's
length."). Bennet & DiLorenzo quote an executive of the American Lung Association acknowledging
consumer perception of a charity's apparent endorsement of a product by the inclusion of the charity's
logo on the product package: "'If you're standing there looking at the shelf, you might say, "Hmm,
maybe I'll buy the product with the logo as opposed to the one that doesn't have any." That's a real-
ity,"' Id. at 13.
292. Alan R. Andreasen, Profits for Nonprofits: Find a Corporate Partner, HARV. BUS. REV.,
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Product 19, a breakfast cereal rich in folic acid.293 In exchange for
$100,000 from Kellogg, the March of Dimes agreed to the use of its name
on Product 19 packages in association with a message about folic acid.
294
To the end consumer, Product 19 could appear to be superior to other
breakfast cereals rich in folic acid in helping to prevent birth defects be-
cause the packaging contains the March of Dimes logo. Thus, consumers
concerned about doing all they can to consume foods that will aid in the
prevention of birth defects may be motivated to purchase Product 19 over
its competitors.
Similarly, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company partnered with the Ameri-
can Heart Association in a cause-related marketing alliance concerning
Pravachol, a cholesterol-lowering drug. In exchange for $600,000, Ameri-
can Heart Association allowed Bristol-Myers Squibb to use its name and
logo on a full page advertisement for Pravachol. Since the mission of the
American Heart Association is the education on heart health and promotion
of a heart-healthy lifestyle, a consumer could easily perceive the inclusion
of the American Heart Association's name and logo on the advertisement
as the charity's endorsement of Pravachol as the cholesterol-lowering drug
of choice. 295
Finally, in 1994, the Arthritis Foundation partnered with Johnson and
Johnson for a specially marked line of acetaminophen, coated aspirin and
ibuprofen, which bore the Arthritis Foundation name and logo as the prod-
uct's brand name.296 Not readily evident from the packaging was that the
products were manufactured and marketed by Johnson & Johnson:
The "Arthritis Foundation" line was no different in formulation
from competing brands. All that was "new" was the marketing arrange-
ment and the cooperative exposure each organization brought to the
other. The mutually beneficial partnership was widely considered to be
the first in which a charity's name was featured as the product's brand
name. Nevertheless, it blurred the line between nonprofit and for-profit
enterprise to such an extent that law enforcement officials cried foul. The
relationship was so vague that 19 state Attorneys General charged [John-
son & Johnson] with deceptive advertising, alleging that consumers were
misled to believe the drugs were new medications created by the Foun-
Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 47, 56.
293. Id. at 57.
294. Id.; see also Cordes & Weisbrod, supra note 28, at 6.
295. See Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 7, at 12 ("In the ad, the drug maker surrounds its pitch
for Pravachol with eye-catching messages about cholesterol and heart disease from the [American Heart
Association].").
296. Id. at 10. The Arthritis Foundation licensed the use of its name and logo to Johnson & Johnson
in exchange for royalty payments exceeding $1 million annually. Id.
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dation .... It simply wasn't clear, the Attorneys General argued, as to
who was behind the product, what was inside the package, or where the
money was going. 2
97
Without careful and prominent explanation of the relationship be-
tween the charity and the company on the product or advertisement for the
product, a consumer's misconception of what it means to have the charity's
logo on the product could lead the consumer to conclude that the charity is
endorsing the product. State regulators share these concerns. For many
years, the American Cancer Society partnered with Nicoderm in the cam-
paign to promote cessation of smoking. As part of this alliance, the Ameri-
can Cancer Society allowed Nicoderm to feature the American Cancer
Society's logo on Nicoderm's packaging "as an additional motivation to
purchase the product and quit smoking" in exchange for fees in excess of
$1 million.298 The campaign caught the eye of several state attorneys gen-
eral who alleged that the product packaging falsely implied that the Ameri-
can Cancer Society endorsed Nicoderm. 299 The manufacturer of Nicoderm,
SmithKline Beecham, eventually paid $2.5 million in a settlement with
twelve state attorneys general over the allegations of deceptive advertis-
ing.300
In addition to concerns of apparent product endorsement, the lack of
uniform disclosure regarding the benefits received by the charity from the
cause-related marketing alliance may cause consumers to form false im-
pressions of the philanthropic benefits being conveyed by the alliance. For
example, in Minneapolis, Barnes & Noble ran ads asking customers to
donate books for a literacy program. Barnes & Noble did not inform cus-
tomers that the company donated nothing to the program; the customers
made all the donations. Barnes & Noble kept all the profits from the in-
297. Id.
298. See Andreasen, supra note 18, at 161; Young, supra note 3, at 202.
299. The American Cancer Society viewed the program not as a product endorsement but as an
alliance to create a national awareness program on the benefits of cessation of smoking. Young, supra
note 3, at 202; but see Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 7, at 13 ("'Is there an implied endorsement?
The answer to that has to be "yes." There is no way around it."' (quoting a vice president of the Ameri-
can Cancer Society)). The American Cancer Society recognizes the marketing value of its brand:
Research shows us that the public trusts and respects the American Cancer Society beyond
virtually any other American institution. We know that the power of that public recognition
adds valuable credibility to the companies and products with which we partner. It is for this
reason that we will chose to partner only with those products and companies which can fur-
ther the mission of the [American Cancer Society].
Id. (quoting an ACS position statement) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300. Edward P. Jones, Sales Pitches Tied to Charities Draw States' Scrutiny, 24 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REv. 613, 613 (1999). In addition, SmithKline Beecham agreed to disclose in its advertisements that the
campaign was as much as business deal as an effort to encourage cessation of smoking. Id.
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creased sale of books during the campaign period. 301
When the promotion states that a percentage of the proceeds or profits
from the sale of the merchandise are donated to charity, consumers may
underestimate the amount of the sale that is actually donated to charity.
During October (national breast cancer awareness month) each year, a pro-
liferation of pink products inundates store shelves.302 Often times, the
product merely states that a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the
product will be used to benefit breast cancer research. Consumer percep-
tion of the amount donated for breast cancer research from their purchases
may far exceed the amount actually donated for the cause:
Barbara Brenner, executive director of Breast Cancer Action, noted
"When companies put pink ribbons on their products, they're no longer
selling a sweater or a watch-they're selling the expectation that buying
their products is going to make a difference in the fight against breast
cancer. Pink ribbon marketing efforts make a significant difference in
corporate bottom lines. But the 'portion of the proceeds' that goes to
breast cancer is all too often minuscule in comparison. '303
Anecdotal evidence of consumer misperceptions of cause-related
product promotions is supported by studies which evaluate the effect of
disclosure in promotional merchandising on consumer estimates of philan-
thropic benefits going to charity.304 Of particular concern in these studies
was the use of "vague" qualifiers, such as a "portion of the proceeds" from
the sale of this product will benefit charity, in advertisements for the prod-
uct.305 Neither the word "portion" nor the word "proceeds" 306 have a stan-
dard quantifiable meaning. Almost seventy percent of the advertisements
studied employed vague references to the amount that would be donated to
charity.307 Consumers who viewed advertisements containing vague refer-
301. Andreasen, supra note 18, at 173-74.
302. See, e.g., Cardona, supra note 59.
303. Andreasen, supra note 18, at 182.
304. See generally Pracejus, Olsen, & Brown, supra note 66.
305. See id. at 22.
306. "Proceeds" could mean either the gross amount of revenues realized from the sale of the
product or the net amount of revenues from the sale after taking into account expenses (i.e., profits).
307. Pracejus, Olsen, & Brown, supra note 66, at 22. Other advertisements employed calculable or
estimable formats:
Calculable formats... refer to descriptions of the donation amount that would allow consum-
ers to calculate the actual amount being donated. For example, a common calculable format is
"X% of the sales." Estimable formats.., provide consumers with only some of the informa-
tion needed to calculate the donation amount. A common estimable format is "X% of profits."
Id. at 21. Of the thirty percent of advertisements that did not use vague references to the donation
amount, companies used estimable formats substantially more often than calculable formats. See id. at
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ences varied widely in their estimation of the amount donated to charity, 308
and consumer estimates of donation amounts almost doubled when the
advertisement disclosed that a "substantial portion" (rather than a "por-
tion") of the proceeds would benefit charity. 309 Consumer misperception of
the actual amount donated to charity is important because consumers pre-
ferred brands which they viewed as making a larger donation to charity
over brands which did not contribute as much in the consumers' view.
310
The impact on the consumer from the use of vague references to the
philanthropic benefits going to charity gives cause for concern. One study
found that the vast majority of descriptions of cause-related marketing
campaigns gave absolutely "no hint to consumers as to the actual amount
being donated.",311 The authors surmise that in some cases, adequate dis-
closure would be difficult because the amount donated to charity may be
based on a complex formula, but caution that vague descriptions are none-
theless deceptive: 3 12
Simply saying in an advertisement "something will be given"
eliminates the need for such complex, potentially confusing disclosures.
However, even where the [disclosure] is technically correct, if such of-
fers result in overestimation of the donation amount by the consumer and
this, in turn, results in differential purchase behavior because of the
overestimation, there is reason for concern from a policy perspective.
... [T]he results of the present set of studies suggest that the par-
ticular abstract ad copy used to describe a [cause-related marketing] offer
does influence perceived donation magnitude. Second, the variance asso-
ciated with these estimates is extremely large, suggesting that consumers
differ widely with respect to what a given term means (e.g., there is not a
universal understanding in the minds of individuals with respect to what
a "portion" means). Third, given that the level of donation impacts
23. Thus, the substantial majority of companies prefer to use disclosures in promotional merchandising
that do not allow consumers to calculate the amount donated to charity resulting from their purchase.
The authors posited one possible motivation for companies to use vague references rather than more
concrete references, such as a fixed dollar amount or percentage of sales price: "[lI]t is not inconceivable
that firms donating smaller percentages are more likely to choose [vague] formats. In other words, firms
that are donating large percentages may be more likely to make their donation amounts explicit in their
advertising." Id. at 24.
308. See id. at 24 (noting that estimations of the percentage of purchase-price donated to charity
varied from zero percent to sixty percent).
309. Id. at 23-24. The author notes, "[wlhat an individual advertiser considers substantial is quite
subjective .... [lit may be substantial relative to industry norms, relative to previous giving, or relative
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choice, the ability of an offer to be estimated with reasonable accuracy
may be of concern to advertisers and regulators.
*..[F]rom a policy perspective, it is suggested that when at all pos-
sible, enterprises identify [cause-related marketing] offers either in the
form of a dollar value per unit, or as a percentage of the sales price. Such
a policy would reduce the variance in estimates, and therefore diminish
the potential for confusion caused by abstract formats.313
The impact cause-related marketing alliances have on consumer per-
ception is an important element of the overall private benefit analysis. Con-
sumers may reasonably form misperceptions about the amount of
philanthropic benefit to the charity from the alliance because of the manner
in which the alliance is conducted, the way in which the packaging or ad-
vertising for the product is presented, or the way in which the alliance is
described to the consumer. When these misperceptions motivate the con-
sumer to purchase the branded or promotional merchandise or other prod-
ucts or services offered by the corporate partner, the private benefit realized
by the corporate partner is enhanced. The charity is in a position to mini-
mize consumer misperception by the control the charity may exercise over
the way the alliance is conducted and described to the consumer and over
the use of its name or logo on the product packaging or advertisement.
Therefore, in formulating the appropriate tax treatment of these transac-
tions for the charity, it is appropriate to consider ways to mitigate consumer
misperception as well as ways to mitigate private benefit from cause-
related marketing alliances in general.
C. Reform Through the Federal Tax Laws
Regulation of vague references in disclosures made to consumers is
necessary to mitigate some of the risk of enhanced private benefit to the
corporate partner. The overwhelming majority of cause-related marketing
disclosures to consumers contain vague references to the philanthropic
benefit. 314 Vague references are troubling because they may cause consum-
ers to form misperceptions about the amount of philanthropic benefit flow-
ing to the charity from the cause-related marketing campaign; 315 consumer
misperceptions then may alter the consumers' buying behavior and moti-
vate consumers to purchase the promotional product over a competing
313. Id. at 26-27 (citation omitted).
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product.316 Increased sales of the promotional product enhance the private
benefit realized by the corporate partner from the cause-related marketing
alliance. 317 Requiring more concrete disclosure of the philanthropic benefit
would mitigate this risk of enhanced private benefit because the consumer
would be less likely to form misperceptions about the amount of the philan-
thropic benefit. 318
Regulation of charitable solicitation typically falls within the province
of the state attorney general. 319 Concerns of federalism give rise to consid-
eration of whether state laws are more appropriately suited to mitigate the
consumer misperception concerns I have raised. Many states require chari-
ties to register with the state prior to soliciting funds from residents of that
state;320 some do not.321 Oftentimes, professional fundraisers hired by the
charity to solicit donations on the charity's behalf are also required to regis-
ter.322 However, a corporate partner in a cause-related marketing alliance is
not hired as a professional fundraiser (i.e., an agent of the charity). There-
fore, the charitable solicitation laws applicable to professional fundraisers
would not apply to cause-related marketing alliances.
Since the corporate partner may maintain control over the manner in
which the cause-related marketing alliance is communicated to consumers,
the state would need to adopt a separate set of rules that apply to the corpo-
rate partner to effectively regulate cause-related marketing alliances. In
fact, several states impose requirements on commercial coventurers 323 un-
316. See id.
317. See supra Part Il.A.
318. See Pracejus, Olsen, & Brown, supra note 66, at 27.
319. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 53-55 (2004).
320. See id. at 317 (noting that thirty-nine states regulate the solicitation of charitable funds). Even
among the states that regulate charitable solicitation, the extent and nature of the regulation varies
greatly from one jurisdiction to the next. For example, Texas only regulates charitable solicitation
activities of veterans organizations and public safety organizations, and telephone solicitations by
charities related to law enforcement. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 303.001-303.154 (Vernon
2009) (law enforcement-related charities); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 1803.001-1803.155 (Vernon
2004) (public safety organizations); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 1804.001-1804.206 (Vernon 2004)
(veterans organizations).
321. See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 303, app. at 496-511 (summarizing charitable
regulation laws of all the states and the District of Columbia and indicating that twelve jurisdictions do
not have charitable solicitation statutes).
322. Seeid. at317.
323. The Model Act Concerning the Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes drafted by the
National Association of Attorneys General ("Model Act") defines "commercial coventurer" as "a
person who for profit is regularly and primarily engaged in trade or commerce other than in connection
with soliciting for charitable organizations or purposes and who conducts a charitable sales promotion."
A MODEL ACT CONCERNING THE SOLICITATION OF FUNDS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES § 1(h) (1986)
[hereinafter MODEL ACT]. States vary in how they define commercial coventurer. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12599.2(a) (West 2005) ("[A]ny person who, for profit, is regularly and primarily engaged in
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der their state charitable solicitation statutes.324 Generally, these commer-
cial coventurer statutes do not require the corporate partner to register with
the state in order to advertise that a portion of the proceeds from the sale of
the branded products will benefit a charity. 325 Although these statutes may
require certain provisions to be included in the agreement between the
charity and the corporate partner prior to the charitable sales promotion,
326
trade or commerce other than in connection with the raising of funds, assets, or property for charitable
organizations or charitable purposes, and who represents to the public that the purchase or use of any
goods, services, entertainment, or any other thing of value will benefit a charitable organization or will
be used for a charitable purpose."); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-16-103(4) (West 2002) (Same as
Model Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.404(4) (West 2006) ("[A]ny person who, for profit, regularly and
primarily is engaged in trade or commerce other than in connection with solicitation of contributions
and who conducts a charitable sales promotion or a sponsor sales promotion."); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 171-
a(6) (McKinney 2002) (same as California).
324. These requirements are generally imposed on a "charitable sales promotion," which typically
includes an "advertising or sales campaign conducted by a commercial co-venturer which represents
that the purchase or use of goods or services offered by the commercial co-venturer are to benefit a
charitable organization." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.404(3); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-16-
103(3). A statement by the corporate partner that a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the branded
merchandise benefit the charity would be a charitable sales promotion and therefore would cause the
corporate partner to be a commercial coventurer.
325. California does not require commercial coventurers to register or file periodic reports with the
California Attorney General provided that the commercial coventurer (i) has a written contract with the
charity, signed by two officers of the charity, prior to the representation to the public of the benefit to
the charity; (ii) within ninety days after the representations to the public, and at the end of each succes-
sive 90 day period during which representations are made, "transfers to [the charity] all funds, assets, or
property received as a result of the representations"; and (iii) provides in conjunction with each such
transfer a written accounting to the charity of all funds, assets, or property received "sufficient to enable
[the charity] to determine that representations made to the public on its behalf have been adhered to
accurately and completely," and to enable the charity to prepare its periodic report filed with the Cali-
fornia Attorney General. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12599.2(b). A commercial coventurer that does not meet
these requirements must register with the California Attorney General each year and pay an annual fee
of $200. Id. § 12599.2(c).
Similarly, New York does not require a commercial coventurer to register or file periodic
reports with the New York Attorney General. Rather, a charity that enters into a contract with a com-
mercial coventurer must file with the New York Attorney General along with its financial report certain
information including a list of the commercial coventurers authorized by the charity to use its name, a
statement of the financial terms and conditions of the coventurer contract, and a statement whether the
commercial coventurer has provided the charity with the required accounting. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 173-
a(4). Florida does not require the commercial coventurer to register but does require that the commer-
cial coventurer file a final accounting of the sales promotion with the Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services upon request. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.414(3).
326. The Model Act requires the agreement between the charity and the commercial coventurer to
be in writing and include the following information:
(1) The goods or services to be offered to the public;
(2) The geographic area where, and the starting and final date when, the offering will be
made;
(3) The manner in which the charitable organization's name will be used, including the rep-
resentation to be made to the public as to the actual or estimated dollar amount or percent per
unit of goods or services purchased or used that will benefit the charitable organization;
(4) If applicable, the maximum dollar amount that will benefit the charitable organization;
(5) The estimated number of units of goods or services to be sold or used;
(6) A provision for a final accounting on a per unit basis to be given by the commercial co-
venturer to the charity and the date by which it will be made;
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the corporate partner is not required to disclose to the consumer the amount
benefitting the charity from the sales promotion except in limited circum-
stances. 327 Thus, even in states which attempt to regulate cause-related
marketing alliances, there is typically no regulation of vague references to
the philanthropic benefit to charity in the disclosures made to consumers.
Even if states were inclined to require more concrete disclosure to
consumers of the philanthropic benefits resulting from the cause-related
marketing alliance, direct regulation of the disclosure made to consumers
by the states may be vulnerable to attack on First Amendment grounds.
Concerned about the large percentage of solicited funds which end up in
the pockets of professional fundraisers, state regulators have made several
attempts to require that professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors
the amount or percentage of the solicited donation that would actually go to
charity. The U.S. Supreme Court has routinely thwarted these attempts by
state regulators as unduly infringing on the professional fundraisers' and
the charities' constitutionally protected right to free speech. 328 Similar con-
(7) A statement that the charitable sales promotion is subject to the requirements of this act;
and
(8) The date by when and the manner in which the benefit will be conferred on the charita-
ble organization.
MODEL ACT § 7(b). Most states do not elaborate in this amount of detail the requirements for the writ-
ten contract. For example, under New York law, a commercial coventurer is simply required to have a
written contract with the charity benefiting from its services. Additionally, within ninety days after the
termination of a sales promotion advertised to benefit a charity, a commercial coventurer must provide
the charity with an accounting stating the number of sold items, the dollar amount of each sale and the
amount paid or to be paid to the charitable organization. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 173-a(3). If the sales pro-
motion lasts over a year, an interim report must be provided to the charity at least annually. Id.
327. Under the Model Act, the commercial coventurer is required to "disclose in each advertise-
ment for the charitable sales promotion the dollar amount or percent per unit of goods or services
purchased or used that will benefit the charitable organization or purpose." MODEL ACT § 7(d). Most
states do not adopt this requirement. For example, under Colorado's charitable solicitation statute, a
commercial coventurer is required to make certain disclosures in its advertisements only when "the
commercial coventurer reasonably expects that more than one-half of all proceeds of a solicitation
campaign will be derived from transactions within the state of Colorado." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-
16-110(1). New York, California and Florida have no disclosure requirement for consumers.
328. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec'y of State
of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. Of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The solicitation of charitable funds is protected speech. Direct regulation of
the content of the solicitation must satisfy a strict scrutiny standard under the First Amendment: (1) the
regulation must promote a substantial state interest; and (2) the regulation must be narrowly tailored to
promote that interest. While the state's interest in protecting charities and the public from fraud is a
sufficiently substantial state interest to justify narrowly tailored regulation of speech, the requirement
that a professional fundraiser disclose to potential donors the percentage of the donation actually con-
tributed to the charity is not narrowly tailored to promote the state's interest in preventing fraud. See
Riley, 487 U.S. at 799-800. The Supreme Court reasoned that there is no nexus between the percentage
of funds retained by the professional fundraiser and incidence of fraud. Munson, 467 U.S. at 966-67.
The Court explained that
a charity might choose a particular type of fundraising drive, or a particular solicitor, expect-
ing to receive a large sum as measured by total dollars rather than the percentage of dollars
remitted. Or, a solicitation may be designed to sacrifice short-term gains in order to achieve
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stitutional challenges may be encountered if state regulators attempt to
require that the content of the disclosure made to consumers by cause-
related marketing alliances specify in concrete terms the amount of philan-
thropic benefit flowing to charity in the form of a dollar value per unit or a
specified percentage of the sales price. 3
29
In contrast to state regulation of disclosures made to consumers under
state charitable solicitation laws, considerably more flexibility exists for
long-term, collateral, or noncash benefits. To illustrate, a charity may choose to engage in the
advocacy or dissemination of information during a solicitation .... Consequently, even if the
State had a valid interest in protecting charities from their own naivet6 or economic weakness,
the [regulation] would not be narrowly tailored to achieve it.
Riley, 487 U.S. at 791-92.
329. Since the regulation would be aimed at the content of the disclosure, a court may apply a strict
scrutiny standard to evaluate whether the requirement that disclosure of the specific dollar amount or
percentage contributed to charity is narrowly tailored to promote a substantial state interest-the protec-
tion of the consumer against fraud. Based on the Supreme Court's opinions in the professional fundrais-
ing cases, it may be difficult for the state to establish the requisite nexus between the content of the
disclosure and the protection against fraud.
Nonetheless, there are two significant differences between cause-related marketing alliances
and professional fundraiser relationships that may impact a court's analysis. First, since the disclosure
sought to be regulated typically is on the product packaging or an advertisement for the product, a court
may view the speech being regulated as commercial speech rather than fully protected speech. Com-
mercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, but court review of regulation of commercial
speech is subject to a more deferential standard than other forms of protected speech. See generally
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Va. Phar-
macy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). However, in the professional
fundraising context, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a more deferential commercial
speech standard should apply to professional fundraising solicitation because the commercial portions
of the solicitation were "inextricably intertwined" with the other protected portions-the charity's
dissemination of its message. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-96. Often times the product packaging or adver-
tisement for the promotional or branded merchandise contains a statement of the charity's cause or
mission. The product may include an insert which describes in more detail the mission and programs of
the charity. Charities certainly view cause-related marketing alliances as fundraising relationships.
Taken together, these elements may lead a court to conclude that the product packaging or advertise-
ment is not "mere commercial speech" but in part "fundraising speech" and thus entitled to greater
protection under the First Amendment. Accordingly, it is unclear what standard a court would apply to
evaluate the state's direct regulation of the content of the disclosure to consumers of the philanthropic
benefit flowing to the charity from the cause-related marketing alliance.
A second distinguishing factor of cause-related marketing alliances is that the corporate
partner is not typically an agent of the charity. In fact, the licensing agreement between the charity and
the corporate partner may take great pains to establish that neither party is acting as an agent for the
other. In the professional fundraising context, the contract is clear that the professional fundraiser is
acting as an agent of the charity in soliciting funds for the charity. Speech made by the professional
fundraiser in the solicitation campaign thus can be attributed to the charity as communication of the
charity's message and more readily determined to be fundraising speech. In the cause-related marketing
context, it is not as clear whose speech is being regulated-the corporate partner's or the charity's. If
the court determines that the speech was not made by the charity, this may impact a court's analysis of
whether fundraising speech is really involved. Typically, however, a charity would retain the right to
approve the use of its name or logo on the product package or in an advertisement for the product and
would also supply any statement of the charity's cause or mission included in the product package or
advertisement. The charity's involvement in reviewing and approving the disclosure would indicate that
the speech is at least in part made by the charity, and thus at least a portion of the speech could be
determined to be fundraising speech. It is unclear how a court would decide this issue.
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incorporating specific requirements for consumer disclosures under the
federal tax laws. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that tax exemption is a
matter of legislative grace. 330 Accordingly, conditions to receive tax ex-
emption which may restrict a charity's fundamental right to free speech are
not subject to strict scrutiny because Congress may validly decide not to
use public tax dollars to subsidize certain speech. 331 For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that restrictions imposed on charities' ability to en-
gage in lobbying activities do not infringe charities' First Amendment
rights.332 Similarly, federal appellate courts have ruled that the prohibition
on charities' ability to engage in political campaign advocacy do not violate
a charity's First Amendment rights.333 Charities have a choice: comply
with the conditions to receive tax exemption or engage in the prohibited
activities and pay tax on its revenues. 334 Therefore, imposing a condition
that restricts the content of consumer disclosures made in cause-related
marketing campaigns, but also creates a safe harbor that exempts the reve-
nue received from taxation as UBTI, arguably would not infringe on chari-
ties' free speech rights.
More importantly, because the disclosures made to consumers impli-
cate the private benefit realized by the corporate partner, federal tax laws
are appropriately used to impose conditions on consumer disclosures that
would minimize private benefit. As explained previously, the effect that
cause-related marketing alliances have on consumer perception is an im-
portant element of the overall private benefit analysis. When consumers
form misperceptions about the amount of philanthropic benefit flowing to
the charity, these misperceptions may cause the consumer to purchase the
branded or promotional merchandise or other products or services offered
by the corporate partner; thus the private benefit realized by the corporate
partner is enhanced. Because the charity is in a position to minimize con-
sumer misperception by controlling the way the alliance is conducted and
described to the consumer and by controlling the use of its name or logo on
the product packaging or advertisement, it is appropriate to consider ways
in which the charity can mitigate consumer misperception as part of the
overall federal tax treatment of charities' cause-related marketing activities.
For example, to address the concem that a consumer may be unaware
of which purchases made online will benefit the charity, the charity could
330. See Comm'rv. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
331. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
332. See id.
333. See Branch Ministries v. Comm'r, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Christian Echoes Nat'l
Ministry, Inc. v. U.S. 470 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1972).
334. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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be required to include a pop up message that is displayed when the con-
sumer clicks on the link from the charity's website to the corporate part-
ner's website to purchase the branded or promotional merchandise. The
pop up message would inform the consumer that he is being redirected to a
site which is not maintained by the charity, that not all purchases made on
the corporate partner's website will benefit the charity, and that the charity
will receive a portion of the sales from only the products which are clearly
marked as benefiting the charity on the corporate partner's website.
To minimize consumer misperceptions about the philanthropic benefit
of the cause-related marketing alliance, the charity could be required to
ensure that the packaging or advertisement for the promotional merchan-
dise or branded merchandise clearly state the dollar amount per unit or the
specific percentage of the sales price that will be donated to the charity
from the sale of the product. The alliance of the Yoplait yogurt "Save Lids
to Save Lives" campaign with the Susan G. Komen Foundation is an ex-
ample of disclosure made to consumers which would meet this require-
ment.335 As discussed above, in its communications made to consumers,
General Mills clearly specifies that ten cents from the sale of every con-
tainer of Yoplait yogurt with a pink lid will be donated to the Susan G.
Komen Foundation, provided the consumer mails the lids to General Mills.
Additionally, General Mills specifies that it will make a minimum donation
of $500,000 and a maximum donation of $1,500,000. This type of disclo-
sure leaves no doubt in the consumers' minds about the amount of philan-
thropic benefit flowing to the Susan G. Komen Foundation. Therefore,
consumers make the decision whether to purchase Yoplait yogurt with pink
lids with clear knowledge of how their purchase will benefit charity. A
charity could ensure that the corporate partner makes more concrete disclo-
sure of the amount donated to charity by including a provision in the licens-
ing agreement which requires the corporate partner to do so. Additionally,
as part of the charity's quality control over the corporate partner's use of
the charity's name or logo on the product packaging or advertisement, the
charity can maintain approval rights over the manner in which the philan-
thropic benefit is disclosed to consumers.
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR SAFE HARBOR GUIDANCE
Given the prevalence of cause-related marketing and the uncertain and
unpredictable tax results identified in this article, I advocate the establish-
ment of Internal Revenue Service guidance that sets forth a dual safe har-
335. For a more detailed discussion of this campaign, see supra Part I.B.
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bor under which charities could operate to claim that revenue they receive
from cause-related marketing alliances is exempt from the unrelated busi-
ness income tax and that the cause-related marketing alliance does not re-
sult in impermissible private benefit. The safe harbor should specifically
take into account the unique nature of cause-related marketing activities
identified in this Article.
As envisioned, the safe harbor would provide that if certain conditions
are satisfied, the charity could treat the revenue received from the corporate
partner as royalty income, thereby excluding the revenue from the charity's
UBTI. Failure to meet the safe harbor should not result in automatic treat-
ment of the revenue as UBTI; rather, the arrangement should then be
evaluated on a case by case basis under the general UBTI principles dis-
cussed above to determine whether the revenue should be subject to tax as
UBTI. Further study needs to be done to determine the specific conditions
that should be contained in a safe harbor for treatment of cause-related
marketing revenues as royalties. The considerations I describe below, how-
ever, are essential for determining that the cause-related marketing alliance
is passive in nature, thus justifying the exclusion of the revenues from the
charity's UBTI as passive royalties.
One of the central concerns about distinguishing royalty income from
compensation for personal services is the amount of services provided by
the charity. Under existing guidance, the determination of the permissible
amount of "insubstantial services" a charity may provide and still qualify
for royalty treatment is uncertain, especially in connection with the charita-
ble organization's exercise of quality control over the use of its name, logo,
and trademarks. As is prudent business practice, a charity would want to
maintain quality control over the use of its name, logo, and trademark by
the corporate partner under the licensing agreement. Therefore, the safe
harbor guidance should include specific examples of permissible and im-
permissible "quality control" services by the charity based on typical li-
censing arrangements used in cause-related marketing alliances. The safe
harbor guidance should also identify other typical "services" a charity may
perform to protect its financial interests, such as periodic inspection of its
corporate partner's books and records.
Another central concern about the appropriate UBTI treatment of
revenues from cause-related marketing alliances is distinguishing royalty
income from advertising income. Especially relevant in this analysis is
consumer perception of apparent endorsement of the product by the charity
by virtue of allowing its name and logo to be placed on the product without
qualification. By approving the placement of its name and logo on the
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product, the charity should be held to the reasonable impressions such
cause-related marketing leaves in the minds of consumers. If the charity's
name and logo are used in such a way as to give consumers the impression
that the charity endorses the product, the charity should be deemed to have
endorsed the product; thus, the payment should be considered advertising
income received by the charity and could no longer be excluded from the
charity's UBTI. Accordingly, the safe harbor guidance should incorporate
principles for minimizing consumer perception of apparent product en-
dorsement; the charity must follow these principles for the marketing ar-
rangement to qualify for the safe harbor. For example, to qualify for the
safe harbor, the charity may be required to ensure that the product packag-
ing or advertisement for promotional products contains an express state-
ment that the charity does not endorse the product. Additionally, if a
charity's website includes links to the corporate partner's website which
would enable consumers to purchase products from the corporate partner's
web store, the charity could be required to include an express statement on
its website that the charity does not endorse the corporate partner's prod-
ucts. 336
Private benefit concerns also should be factored into the design of the
safe harbor addressing cause-related marketing alliances. Cause-related
marketing alliances allow a charity's most valuable assets, its brand and
goodwill, to be used to benefit private entities. While the charity indeed
benefits in return, the central concern needs to be whether the corporate
partner is improperly benefiting from the use of the charity's brand or
goodwill. Thus, to qualify for the safe harbor, a charity should be required
to satisfy certain conditions designed to minimize the private benefit to the
corporate partner from the cause-related marketing alliance. Similar to the
safe harbor for UBTI treatment, failure to meet the safe harbor related to
private benefit should not result in automatic revocation of a charity's tax
exemption; rather, the arrangement should then be evaluated on a case by
case basis under general private benefit principles.
Adequately addressing private benefit concerns would entail ensuring
that the private benefit to the corporate partner is not substantial in com-
parison to the benefit the charity receives from the cause-related marketing
336. 1 would like to emphasize that the foregoing safeguards would only be conditions the charity
must satisfy to qualify for the safe harbor; charities would be free to structure the financial terms of
their cause-related marketing alliances as they see fit. Only charities seeking the protection of the safe
harbor would need to incorporate the required safeguards in their licensing agreements. Of course,
charities not seeking the safe harbor may still believe they have incorporated adequate safeguards in
their licensing agreements, and thus, they would be able to argue that the revenues received from the
licensing agreement are royalties on a case by case basis.
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alliance. Determining the safeguards necessary for achieving this result will
require further study of how to quantify the private benefits corporate part-
ners receive from cause-related marketing alliances. Some potential safe-
guards may include specifying a minimum percentage of the revenues from
the sales of the branded or promotional merchandise that must be donated
to the charity, eliminating financial caps on the amount donated to charity,
specifying that any formula to determine the amount donated to charity be
based on gross revenues instead of profits, or otherwise ensuring that the
amount donated to the charity is not limited to an insubstantial amount as
compared to the benefits received by the corporate partner.
Adequately addressing private benefit concerns also would require
mitigation of consumer misperceptions about the amount of philanthropic
benefit to the charity from the alliance. Such misperceptions can arise be-
cause of the manner in which the alliance is conducted, the way in which
the packaging or advertising for the product is presented, or the way in
which the alliance is described to the consumer. As discussed previously,
mitigating consumer misperception may entail requiring the charity to dis-
play a pop-up message when consumers link from the charity's website to a
corporate partner's web store to purchase branded merchandise. The pop-
up message would clarify that the charity only benefits from the sale of the
branded merchandise and not from the sale of other products found in the
corporate partner's web store. This also may entail requiring the charity to
ensure that vague references to the philanthropic benefit flowing to the
charity are not used in communications to the consumer about the cause-
related marketing alliance. The charity could be required to include a pro-
vision in the licensing agreement which requires the corporate partner to
clearly state on the packaging or advertisement for the promotional mer-
chandise or branded merchandise the dollar amount per unit or specific
percentage of the sales price that will be donated to the charity from the
sale of the product. Additionally, as part of the charity's quality control
over the corporate partner's use of the charity's name or logo on the prod-
uct packaging or advertisement for the product, the charity can be required
to maintain approval rights over the manner in which the philanthropic
benefit is disclosed to consumers in the licensing agreement.
Overall, the conditions under which revenues from cause-related mar-
keting alliances would qualify for safe harbor classification should be de-
signed to ensure that the charity's involvement is passive, that there is no
apparent endorsement of the product by the charity, and that private benefit
to the corporate partner is insubstantial. Further study of existing cause-
related marketing licensing arrangements should be conducted to discern
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commonalities among the arrangements, to determine typical provisions
that satisfy the criteria discussed in this article, and to identify provisions
that give cause for concern that the revenues from the arrangements might
not be exempt from taxation. With additional study, conditions for safe
harbor treatment could be established that reflect reasonable provisions in
licensing arrangements; thus, charities would have a realistic expectation of
structuring their cause-related marketing alliances to fit within the safe
harbor.
CONCLUSION
Cause-related marketing is a booming industry; countless charities and
for-profit companies are engaged in cause-related marketing alliances.
Despite the widespread success of cause-related marketing, the Internal
Revenue Service has issued little guidance on acceptable practices by
charities engaged in cause-related marketing. A revenue ruling or Treasury
regulations setting forth safe harbor provisions for permitted cause-related
marketing alliances would be mutually beneficial for charities and the In-
ternal Revenue Service. It would reduce the administrative burden on the
Internal Revenue Service, which now must examine these arrangements on
a case by case basis, and it would allow charities to more easily comply
with the law. In particular, smaller charities that cannot readily afford legal
counsel to assist them in structuring complex licensing transactions would
benefit. Safe harbor guidance in the area of cause-related marketing taxa-
tion would thus be a "win-win" situation for charities and the Internal
Revenue Service.
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